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Executive Summary
The problem of interoperability is not a new one in the area of warfare. During
Desert Storm, US Navy carriers were unable to receive Joint Force Air Component
Commander Air Tasking Orders electronically due to bandwidth constraints on satellite
connections. Prior to the Gulf War, the USS Vincennes brought down an Iranian
commercial airliner after personnel misinterpreted information presented on fire control
system displays. As far back as one cares to look, interoperability has played a role in
the effectiveness of military command and control operations.
The methodology for examining the degree of interoperability a system exhibits
has historically been to test on a "one-to-one" basis with every other system it
theoretically could interact with. However, as the number of automated information
systems has risen and interoperability requirements begin to converge, the connections
between systems that would have to be considered increases exponentially at the rate of
(N2-N)/2. Due to this effect, current organizational processes have found it impossible to
develop adequate integrating tools and metrics to completely facilitate the design, testing,
and certification of C4I systems.
DoD 5000.2-R makes use of the terms compatibility, interoperability and
integration, collectively known as "CII". In relation to the other terms, "interoperability"
is defined as the ability of systems to exchange services and operate effectively together.
"Integration" is generally considered to go beyond interoperability to involve some
degree of functional dependence (tighter coupling), while "compatibility" is something
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less than interoperability, with systems not necessarily interfering with each other's
functioning, but also not implying the ability to exchange services. The continuum
created between compatibility, interoperability, and integration provides the requirements
generation process a type of referential "baseline" upon which to frame comparisons.
Thankfully, interoperability has been receiving increased attention from the
operational community. As forward-looking doctrinal discussions such as Joint Vision
2020 take place, it is becoming apparent that achieving dominance of the "infosphere"
requires much more than just having the most advanced information systems.
Interoperability success in the past has come as a result of the one-to-one
certification effort and the emphasis on standardization compliance. We have realized for
some time that the devil of assuring interoperability is in the details of implementation.
The problem we continue to have is that testing and evaluation efforts have been
predominately focused on system-centric issues. Certification of system-to-system
interfaces does not conclude the integration process; it merely begins it.
The focus of the thesis is to recommend a more integrated way of aligning the
organizational and technical aspects available today that define interoperability and to
suggest directions for the development of future efforts. We started by examining
interoperability policy within DoD. Several publications deal with interoperability, most
notably CJCSI 62 12.0 IB and DoDI 4630.8. The problem with these documents is that
responsibility for assessing and certifying interoperability was divided amongst different
agencies. To compound this problem, none of these agencies was given the authority to
intercede in Service acquisition programs if interoperability criteria were not met.
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As a part of this process we examined the requirements-to-capabilities (R-to-C)
model. The purpose of this was to see where interoperability "fit" in the acquisition
cycle. DoD 5000.2-R and CJCSI 3 170.01A both address this R-to-C cycle. The dilemma
in this area is that requirements are having a difficult time keeping up with technology,
vice the other way around that we have observed in the past. Operational forces (the
warfighters) have difficulty effectively expressing their needs within the context of
emerging technology to the development and acquisition communities.
How DoD addresses these problems was our next phase of analysis. The Joint
Technical Architecture, Global Information Grid, and Defense Information Infrastructure
Common Operating Environment all point towards the need for an all-encompassing
"system-of-systems" (SoS) concept, defined as mission-based integrated C4I systems that
are scalable, driven by common standards, and can share information transparently within
their own SoS as well as between different SoSs.
DoD is still nowhere near a global information structure that is interoperable. We
found several reasons for this failure, but, as might be expected, the Planning,
Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) was the main culprit. This system
encourages competition amongst the services for limited resources. To maintain control
of their own funding Services develop their own programs, often contrary to another
Services programs. Such "stove-piped" acquisition programs breed interoperability
problems from their conception to their fielding and beyond.
Another problem we examined is the interoperability certification process. The
Joint Interoperability Test Command is the DoD agency responsible for certifying
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systems interoperability. The problem with their approach is that the thrust of the
certification effort is still focused on the operational testing of one-to-one interfaces with
little regard to SoS affiliation or mission-defined functionality. We did discover that
strides are being taken to address this, specifically through the efforts of integration
efforts of the U.S. Joint Forces Command.
Finally, though Services are becoming increasingly concerned with
interoperability, they do not currently have the tools to assess, test, and construct
interoperable architectures. Several agencies within DoD are taking steps to correct this
deficiency. We looked at several of these agencies and what processes/tools they were
developing. The Joint Staff J-6 is the sponsor for the Joint C4ISR Architecture
Planning/Analysis System (JCAPS), the most mature and capable of the currently
available tools, as well as the automated Levels of Information Systems Interoperability
(LISI) Inspector tool. The Marine Corps Systems Command is developing a central
database for C4I architectures known as the MAGTF C4I Systems Technical Architecture
and Repository (MSTAR) that would assist in developing integrated C4I "go-to-war"
architectures. SPAWAR Systems Charleston is developing the Joint Maritime Tool for
Interoperability Risk Assessment (JMTIRA), a tool that assesses risk associated with
interoperability problems.
What is required is an overarching model of where these tools fit in the larger C4I
development process, and then to determine how they can be employed synergistically.
All of the tools showed promise but will require further development and integration. We
determined that the best elements of each tool should be integrated into one system that
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could address interoperability in the entire requirements generation process. Embedding
such a tool within the R-to-C model would provide a collaborative and comprehensive
development environment that would greatly benefit C4I system interoperability in spite
of the inherent limitations of the DoD acquisition and PPBS cycles.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Without major strides in the area of interoperability we will
not achieve the information superiority essential to





The purpose of this thesis is to examine the interoperability of Command,
Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) systems within the
Department of Defense (DoD). Interoperability is a problem as old as combat itself; with
the advent of the Information Age and resultant development of the strategy of network-
centric warfare, interoperability has become increasingly significant as a criterion for
mission success, while at the same time becoming more and more difficult to
satisfactorily achieve. Various organizations and procedures dealing with interoperability
have been caught in an evolutionary cycle, first attempting to define the interoperability
"battlespace" and then to formulate an overarching framework that brings some
semblance of order to it. This thesis examines several of these initiatives, comments on
their effectiveness and future potential, and suggests new ideas that could be
implemented to improve C4I system interoperability.
B. BACKGROUND
1. History
The problem of interoperability is not a new one in the area of warfare. During
Desert Storm, US Navy carriers were unable to receive Joint Force Air Component
Commander Air Tasking Orders electronically due to bandwidth constraints on satellite
connections. Prior to the Gulf War, the USS Vincennes brought down an Iranian
commercial airliner after personnel misinterpreted information presented on fire control
system displays. In Vietnam, Air Force close-air support pilots flying with UHF radios
could not talk directly with most Army units, equipped only with VHF sets. At the
beginning of World War II, Army Signals personnel detected the Japanese attack force
130 miles from Pearl Harbor utilizing radar, but an Air Corps watch officer, skeptical of
the capabilities of the newly developed technology, discounted the report and took no
action. As far back as one cares to look, interoperability has played a role in the
effectiveness of military command and control operations. However, the more important
implication is that as we begin to look forward, we are finding that not only is
interoperability becoming an increasingly vital commodity, but that the "boundaries" of
the problem seem to be expanding at a rate greater than our ability to solve it.
2. Joint Vision 2020
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) doctrinal publication Joint Vision
2020 (JV2020) states:
The basis for this new conceptual framework for operations
is found in the improvements that can be assured by
information superiority. Enhanced Command & Control
and much improved intelligence, along with other
applications of new technology, will transform traditional
military functions. These transformations will be so
powerful that they become, in effect, new operational
concepts: dominant maneuver; precision engagement; full-
dimensional protection; and focused logistics. In
combination, these will provide our forces with a new
conceptual framework: full-spectrum battlespace
dominance.
The actualization of this vision is heavily predicated on the assumption that
information superiority has already been effectively achieved. As we become
increasingly dependent on networked forces to implement this strategy, we are finding
that it is just as much about the interoperability of technology as the individual
technologies themselves that becomes the principal enabler of combat power.
As advanced systems in the acquisition pipeline are fielded and legacy systems
receive upgrades to extend and enhance their service life, interoperability issues are
becoming increasingly complex. The methodology for examining the degree of
interoperability a system exhibits has historically been to test on a "one-to-one" basis
with every other system it theoretically could interact with. However, as the number of
automated information systems has risen and interoperability requirements begin to
converge, the connections between systems that would have to be considered increases
exponentially at the rate of (N2-N)/2. Due to this effect, current organizational processes
have found it impossible to develop adequate integrating tools and metrics to completely
facilitate the design, testing, and certification of C4I systems.
3. The GAO Reports
a) GAO/NSIAD-87-124
In 1987 the General Accounting Office (GAO) completed "DoD's Efforts
to Achieve Interoperability Among C3 Systems " at the request of the House Committee
on Government Operations. 1 This report cited three primary causes for interoperability
problems:
• Decentralized management structure.
• Lack of clearly defined joint requirements.
• Absence of effective enforcement authority to make interoperability decisions.
The fundamental recommendation of the report introduced the concept of certification of
a system's interoperability as a prerequisite to its being developed and procured, and
specifically outlined the withholding of appropriated funds from programs that did not
comply with this new certification process.
b) GAO/NSIAD-94-47
Seven years later, this time at the request of the Secretary of Defense,
GAO published "DoD 's Renewed Actions To Improve C4I Interoperability May Not Be
' United States General Accounting Office. "Interoperability: DoD's Efforts to Achieve Interoperability
Among C3 Systems". GAO/NSIAD-87-124.
Adequate ".2 This report highlighted the importance of architecture (i.e. the structure
and relationship among the components of a system) in achieving interoperability while
reaffirming that much of the earlier report's findings were still problematic. DoD's "C4I
for the Warrior" (C4IFTW) initiative, as it was called at the time, had been published two
years prior as a result of Gulf War lessons learned. C4IFTW was designed to address
many of those same problems. The GAO report concluded that C4IFTW:
• Showed a prolonged phased implementation process extending over ten years.
• Relied on unproven technological advances with unknown costs.
• Was highly dependent on a yet-undeveloped comprehensive joint C4I
architecture.
GAO found that many of the intrinsic problems with the process of
interoperability could be traced back to the contentious relationship between the military
service components (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines) and the joint command structure.
Not only were traditional operational areas of tactics and doctrine being negotiated
between these entities but as a result of the information revolution, technological issues
would now also have to be considered.
To address this dichotomy between service and joint priorities, the GAO
report included several recommendations. First among these was the idea that all
developmental C4I systems should be "born joint"; i.e. that all design specifications
would now originate from within the joint requirements structure vice that of the
2 United States General Accounting Office. "DoD's Renewed Actions To Improve C4I Interoperability
May Not Be Adequate". GAO/NSIAD-94-47.
individual services. It was hoped that this paradigm shift would serve to reduce the
interoperability problems that were introduced by service-defined and service-specific
information exchange standards.
Another of the GAO recommendations that related to the services/joint
issue was to minimize the reliance on "ad hoc" assembly of information systems. GAO's
observations concluded that much of the challenge of interoperability came from the
inability of DoD to adequately define which sets of systems would be required to
function together. While this recommendation was a bit simplistic at the time, given the
changing face of the military mission and the increasing importance of flexible task-based
structuring of forces, it did bring to light another of the weaknesses of the interoperability
effort; with joint task force organization becoming more necessity than choice, the
requirement was identified for a baseline architecture that would facilitate this ad hoc
process, as well as automated tools to design and test the functionality of these emergent
"systems of systems" (SoS). Future U.S. military operations will inevitably be joint,
involving elements from more than one service, often assembled with minimal time for
planning and deployment in dynamic configurations for highly diverse missions.
Achieving this sort of C4I interoperability is inherently a horizontal, cross-functional
challenge that must be addressed in a largely vertical, single-source developmental world.
C4IFTW was one of the first integrated attempts to define this type of
required interoperability architecture. The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)
was given the lead in this effort, and its Joint Interoperability and Engineering
Organization held primary responsibility for technical development. Known as the Joint
Tactical C3 Architecture, this early attempt at defining the interoperability battlespace
came under sharp criticism. Program Managers (PMs) and the warfighting community
alike found the product too abstract for planning purposes, out-of-date upon its issuance,
and generally lacking in detail and operational perspective.
A complementary requirement to an interoperability architecture is a
mechanism for the enforcement of compliance. GAO again identified this as a problem
area for DoD. At the time of the report's publication, there was no organizational entity
that could act as a joint program management authority to fill this particular void. GAO
recommended the creation of such an organization, one that would be empowered in the
budgetary process to influence program funding based on interoperability certification
requirements.
The final recommendation of GAO in 1994 was the assignment to the US
Atlantic Command the role of interoperability "integrator", consisting of the following
responsibilities:
• Assess C4I requirements for potential effect on joint task force operations.
• Provide guidance to DISA on development of the joint C4I architecture.
• Ensure continuous C4I interoperability assessment through joint training
exercises.
This initiative was rejected by DoD at the time as being of little value added, stating that
validation and compliance issues should reside at the Joint Staff level and architecture
remain the sole purview of DISA.
c) GAO/NSIAD-98-73
The House National Security Committee requested that GAO follow-up on
its 1994 report, and in 1998 it published "Weaknesses in DoD's Process for Certifying
C4I Systems ' Interoperability"? This document was a scathing indictment of the failure
of DoD's interoperability efforts over the past ten years. The primary focus of the report
was the interoperability certification process as outlined in the various DoD directives
and instructions. GAO found that certification remained ineffective for a variety of
reasons.
First among these certification problems was that compliance with the
applicable set of interoperability documents, as they were written at the time, could not be
implemented. As the saying goes, "the law is on the books, but it would take all their
resources to enforce it". While stated DoD policy required that all new or modified
systems be certified or obtain a waiver from certification testing prior to proceeding past
Milestone III (Production or Fielding/Deployment Approval), GAO found that many
systems were proceeding to these latter acquisition stages without being certified,
approved by the very same oversight authorities who were also charged with enforcing
the certification requirements.
The Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC), established in 1989 by
DISA to be the sole certification agent of C4I interoperability, had no real organizational
3 United States General Accounting Office. "Weaknesses in DoD's Process for Certifying C4I Systems'
Interoperability". GAO/NSIAD-98-73.
authority to compel PMs (who answered to the individual services) or the acquisition
milestone decision authorities (who often were not required to comply with DoD-level
guidance) to require that systems be presented for testing nor to enforce its findings and
recommendations when systems were submitted. It was the finding of the GAO that PMs
often knowingly did not submit systems for testing, believing their programs would in all
likelihood proceed more smoothly and quickly if they did not.
Another problem encountered in certification efforts was that within an
acquisition system's Planning, Programming, and Budgetary System (PPBS) cycle,
interoperability testing line items often became prime targets for reduction or all-out cuts
from a variety of "mark-up" authorities. This was caused in great part due to a lack of
knowledge and understanding concerning the interoperability process throughout the
budgetary cycle and particularly to a lack of a centralized "champion" of the
interoperability cause. Exacerbating this situation was the fact that due to the nature of
interoperability not only did the system in question need to provide adequate funding for
its own certification testing, but many yet-to-be identified systems would also be required
to set aside their own budgetary authority in support as well.
4. Present Day
Interoperability continues to be a difficult issue to address within DoD. Many
successful efforts have been implemented, but at times it has seemed that as one problem
is solved two more arise to replace it. As with any sort of knowledge, the more we
discover about interoperability the more we find out how much we still have to learn.
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Our understanding, tools, and procedures are the best they have ever been and are
improving all the time, yet the size and scope of the problem they are intended to address
is increasing as well. Cutting-edge technologies often sit idly by at the pier or flight line
because they cannot work together. To draw an analogy, DoD grows the best vegetables
in the world, yet we still have a difficult time making a salad.4
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Principle Research Question:
• Is a totally interoperable C4I system attainable, or even desirable, in the joint
operational environment?
Secondary Research Questions:
• What is the current interoperability assessment and certification process?
• What are the strengths/weaknesses of available automated interoperability tools?
• How do the assessment tools compare?
• How can the assessment tools be integrated?
• How can the interoperability assessment process be innovated to improve
performance of C4I systems in the joint operational environment?
• How can the interoperability assessment process be better integrated into the
acquisition cycle?
4 Buchanan III, H. Lee, ASN(RD&A). Speech. 18 Jul 00.
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D. METHODOLOGY
The methodology used in this research consists of the following steps:
• Conduct a literature search on interoperability definitions, OSD policies, and
service policies.
• Conduct interviews of key players in the relevant agencies, focusing on their
efforts and their interpretations of interoperability policy.
• Collect information from the Interoperability Conference hosted by JITC in April
2000.
• Conduct an analysis ofhow interoperability fits into the current acquisition
cycles.
• Conduct an analysis of the available automated interoperability assessment tools.
• Synthesize interoperability tools into acquisition and certification processes.
• Draw conclusions and make recommendations based on the experiment.
E. ORGANIZATION
Chapter I provides insight into the environment of interoperability as well as
introduces some of the significant concepts in this area. Chapters II and III examine
administrative issues regarding interoperability and the various attempts by DoD to come
to grips with the problems surrounding it. Chapters IV and V provide a review,
comparison, and proposed integration of various automated stand-alone tools that have
been developed to address interoperability. Chapter VI provides a listing of conclusions,
recommendations, lessons learned, and areas for further study.
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F. BENEFITS OF STUDY
The focus of the thesis is to recommend a more integrated way of aligning the
organizational and technical aspects available today that define interoperability and to
suggest directions for the development of future efforts. General readers of this paper
will gain an understanding of the underlying issues that have plagued interoperability
efforts in the past, become acquainted with current efforts to address these issues, gain an
understanding of the factors that affect the state of interoperability efforts, and evaluate
the potential effectiveness of future interoperability initiatives. The conclusions and
recommendations put forth as a result of this research will be made available to
organizations presently involved with the interoperability certification process,
specifically at the Marine Corps Systems Command and the Joint Command and Control
Integration and Interoperability Group's Joint Forces Program Office.
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II. INTEROPERABILITY ISSUES
The pace of technological change, especially as it fuels
changes in the strategic environment, will place a premium
on our ability to foster innovation in our people and
organizations across the entire range ofjoint operations.
CJCS Joint Vision 2020 Publication
June 2000
A. INTRODUCTION
Joint Vision 2010 was an attempt to anticipate the future of warfighting by
assimilating the improved C4I capabilities available in the information age, stressing
technological innovation as the means to enable interoperable DoD systems. Joint Vision
2020 encompasses more than just information technology, expanding into all aspects of
joint force application, thereby intensifying the overall importance interoperability plays
in mission success. 5
The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. The first objective is to provide an
overview of the various orders and directives that pertain to DoD interoperability.
Specifically, the following documents will be discussed:
• DoD Regulation 5000.2-R : Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition
Programs and Major Automated Information System Acquisition Programs; 1
1
May 99.
• DoD Instruction 4630.8 : Procedures for Compatibility, Interoperability, and
Integration of Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I)
Systems; 18 Nov 92.
CJCS Publication. "Joint Vision 2020". http://www.dtic.mil/iv2020/
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• CJCS Instruction 3 170.01A : Requirements Generation System; 10 Aug 99.
• CJCS Instruction 62 12.0 IB : Interoperability and Supportability ofNational
Security Systems, and Information Technology Systems; 08 May 00.
The second part of the chapter presents the PPBS process as it pertains to
interoperability, introducing several of the standardization and architectural initiatives
being utilized within DoD, to include the Defense Information Infrastructure Common
Operating Environment (DII COE), Joint Technical Architecture, and the C4ISR
Architecture Framework.
B. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTEROPERABILITY DOCUMENTS
1. DoD Regulation 5000.2-R - 11 May 99
a) Interoperability in the Acquisition Process
DoD 5000.2-R puts forth policies for all DoD acquisition by establishing a
simplified and flexible framework for translating mission needs into affordable, well-
managed programs. Its purpose is to provide overarching guidance for the entire
acquisition process. The current regulation is a recently published version of the original
5000-series instruction issued in 1991. It is undergoing major revision, with
interoperability specifically identified as one of the primary areas of review.6
One of the significant changes to the regulation focuses on integrating
interoperability considerations into the time-phased framework of current acquisition
6 Nutwell, Robert, RADM, DASD(C3ISR&S). "New Interoperability Policies and Processes'
Presentation.
14
strategy. PMs are instructed to place special emphasis on the transition of
interoperability requirements between phases as the overall project progresses through the
acquisition management lifecycle.
b) Standardization Initiatives
System engineering techniques such as interface control, open systems
design, and the use of standards such as the DoD Technical Reference Model (TRM) are
identified as tools to assist in maintaining the integrity and validity of interoperability
requirements as they proceed through the different acquisition phase transitions. In
March 2000 the TRM replaced all versions of the Technical Architecture Framework for
Information Management (TAPIM) as DoD's official standardization policy document.7
The TRM is not a specific system architecture; rather it defines services,
interfaces, and relationships used in support of technical architecture/interoperability
framework development. The purpose of the TRM is to provide a common conceptual
framework that defines an accepted vocabulary of architecture terminology as well as
providing a high-level description of the information technology domain. A primary
objective of the TRM is to establish a context for understanding how to relate the
disparate technologies needed to implement information management. The TRM
reference model defines a target technical environment for the acquisition, development,
and support ofDoD information systems. The TRM is by necessity a "living" document;
7 Gansler, J., USD(AT&L). "Promulgation ofDoD TRM Version 1.0". DoD Memorandum dtd 21 Mar
00.
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it contains an evolving set of comprehensive protocols and definitions to support
emergent systems and applications as well as including consideration for interoperability
requirements in regards to migration and legacy initiatives when such capabilities are
deemed essential for mission continuity and accomplishment. All DoD components and
agencies have been tasked with revising their respective architectural views based on the
new TRM.
c) Compatibility, Interoperability, and Integration
DoD 5000.2-R makes use of the terms compatibility, interoperability and
integration, collectively known as "CII". In relation to the other terms, "interoperability"
is defined as the ability of systems to exchange services and operate effectively together.
"Integration" is generally considered to go beyond interoperability to involve some
degree of functional dependence (tighter coupling), while "compatibility" is something
less than interoperability, with systems not necessarily interfering with each other's
functioning, but also not implying the ability to exchange services. The continuum
created between compatibility, interoperability, and integration provides the requirements
generation process a type of referential "baseline" upon which to frame comparisons.
2. DoD Instruction 4630.8 - 18 Nov 92
a) Compatibility, Interoperability, and Integration Procedures
DoDI 4630.8 is the implementation instrument for policies outlined in
DoD Directive 4630.5 "Compatibility, Interoperability, and Integration of Command,
Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) Systems". It assigns responsibilities to
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organizational roles/functional areas as well as prescribing procedures for the execution
of CII compliance. These procedures define how to develop, acquire, and deploy C4I
systems to meet the essential CII needs of US forces. An important distinction made in
this instruction is that, for purposes of CII, all C4I systems developed for use by US
forces are considered to be "joint", the implication being that individual service sponsors
can no longer "stovepipe" systems for exclusive use.
b) Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs ofStaff
One of the specific roles outlined in this instruction is that of the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). CJCS is given the responsibility of approving and
documenting changes to doctrinal concepts and associated operational procedures that
will have CII implications, effectively consolidating this authority at the joint level. The
procedure for achieving this within the PPBS is observed during requirements validation
(Milestone - Approval to Conduct Concept Studies) and certification testing (Milestone
III - Production or Fielding/Deployment Approval).
c) DISA
Another of the set of responsibilities presented in DoDI 4630.8 is that of
the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). Re-designated in 1991 (formerly the
Defense Communications Agency), DISA's primary function in the interoperability arena
is that of being DoD's single point of contact for the development of information
technology standards. It is DISA policy to maintain a list of approved interface standards
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with which new and existing command & control, weapons, and automated information
systems must be in compliance.
The mission of DISA, via its Joint Information and Engineering
Organization (JIEO) sub-command, is to provide and maintain DoD technical
architectures and standards. JIEO's Center for Standards is the DoD's executive agent
for the centralized management of information technology standards and was originally
responsible for producing the TAFIM as an aid in C4I system configuration management.
The Center for Standards is also involved in the development, coordination, and adoption
of commercial standards. Another JIEO activity, the Center for Integration, provides
support services such as product integration and technical compliance testing, to include
metrics collection and analysis of hardware/software and network performance, primarily
focused on Global Command and Control System (GCCS) applications.
One of DoD's long-term objectives is to develop a global C4I
infrastructure that can accommodate the widest possible range of missions and
operational scenarios by allowing users to enter the infrastructure at any time or place. 8
In theory, this "network of networks" or Global Information Grid (GIG) will be
constructed upon the foundation that DISA's standardization program provides. The
GIG, which is proposed as an all-encompassing globally integrated networking
operations weapon system, will provide for "assured interoperable communications"
8 Nutwell, Robert, RADM, DASD(C3ISR&S). "New Interoperability Policies and Processes'
Presentation.
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among several military systems that carry out varying missions ranging from peace to
wartime operations. If realized, the GIG will sustain interoperability by providing
information exchange standardization for user and source components. DISA's efforts at
developing this capability rely heavily on the management of interface definitions, i.e. the
point at which one system must exchange information with another system or network of
systems.
3. CJCSI 3170.01A - 10 Aug 99
a) Interoperability Requirements Cycle
CJCSI 3 170.01A provides policy guidance into all aspects of DoD's
requirements generation system. The requirements generation system is the process that
provides decision-makers with information on current and emergent operational needs,
and then provides the planning and documentation to effectively translate these needs into
the PPBS and acquisition management lifecycles.
b) Need/Requirement/Capability Flow
Commanders in Chief (CinCs), in their role as "warfighter", are the
primary initiators of the requirements generation process. Based both upon experience
and forward-looking analysis, Mission Need Statements (MNSs) are developed to fill
emergent gaps in our warfighting capabilities. A MNS is a non-system specific
document written in broad operational terms. These MNSs provide the background for
the formulation of Capstone Requirements Documents (CRDs). CRDs capture
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overarching requirements (to include interoperability) for entire operational mission
areas, such as Combat Identification or Theater Air & Missile Defense.
CRDs are developed when a well-defined function requires multiple
systems, some of which may have been developed by different service components, a
relationship also known as a "system of systems" (SoS). A single system is typically
defined as a set of different elements connected or related so as to perform a unique
function not achievable by the elements alone, while a SoS extends this construct by
replacing element with system. CRDs are intended to assist in the development of
Operational Requirements Documents (ORDs) by providing a standardization
environment that must be complied with by all elements identified as members of a
particular SoS.
c) Key Performance Parameters
1 he ORD is a document containing operational performance requirements
for an individual concept or system that define the proposed capabilities needed to satisfy
a MNS. Systems that are described in ORDs are defined in terms of Key Performance
Parameters (KPPs). KPPs are the capabilities or characteristics considered essential for
mission accomplishment and are constructed in terms of measurable threshold and
objective values. It is interesting to note that since CRDs are defined by function and
ORDs are defined by system, there is a "many-to-many" relationship between them.9 A
9 Rosen, David, Capt, JFPO. "Defining the Interoperability Battlespace". Presentation.
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CRD will generally require a set of ORDs (representing the SoS) to implement the
defined functionality and an individual system ORD may have membership in multiple
CRDs. ORDs must be able to trace their KPPs back to every CRD supported, and the
CRD must have a relationship defined for every ORD in its SoS, introducing a
combinatorial problem to requirements management.
CJCSI 3 170.01A mandates the inclusion of a stand-alone interoperability
Key Performance Parameter (I-KPP) in all CRDs and ORDs. Within each ORD an
Information Exchange Requirements (IER) matrix identifies all the elements of
information to be shared by any two or more systems. IERs are the primary measure
used in defining the I-KPP values in both CRDs and ORDs. In CRDs, IERs are defined
as those information exchanges that are between the systems that make up the SoS as
well as those that are external to the CRD's domain, while for ORDs, IERs are only those
information exchanges that are external to the individual system. CRD IERs should not
be construed as imposing any specific material solution, but are designed to identify the
basic characteristics of the information that needs to be present in order to support the
functionality defined by the CRD. CRD I-KPPs, and hence the IERs that the I-KPPs are
derived from, are measurable, while ORD I-KPPs must be measurable and as well as
testable in support of the certification process.
d) Requirements into Capabilities
The operational needs identified by the user community in the MNS,
having been transformed into requirements in the CRDs and ORDs, are now sent to the
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component Program Management or System Program offices for development and
production. It is at this point in the requirements generation cycle that the original
warfighter needs begin to take the shape of actual capabilities, signaling the beginning of
the acquisition process, and ultimately leading to the fielding of a new/modified system.
At the end of this process these systems transfer from the acquisition to the operational
community, with the lead service identified during development also typically
responsible for its eventual fielding, maintenance, and support.
4*
Planning / Acquisitions
Figure 2-1, Need/Requirement/Capability Cycle10
The last link in the overall process occurs when the CinCs, in their roles as
Joint Task Force (JTF) commanders, draw upon the component structures for sourcing of
10 Rosen, David, Capt, JFPO. "Defining the Interoperability Battlespace". Presentation.
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the fielded systems in support of a task-organized unit, typically put together utilizing the
"ad-hoc" methodology discussed in Chapter I. As these JTFs execute their assigned
missions, various shortcomings in capabilities will again become manifest to the CinC
staffs, either in response to changes in the perceived external threat or by
experience/experimentation with our own tactics and doctrine. This becomes the impetus
for the formulation ofnew MNSs, and the cycle begins again.
4. CJCSI 6212.01B - 08 May 00
a) Overview
This document is the primary reference for all interoperability issues
within DoD. It provides inclusive guidance into C4I systems acquisition and the function
CII plays in the process. CJCSI 62 12.0 IB outlines the procedures for evaluating MNS
and ORD documents, as well as establishes policies to enforce system validation and
supportability certification procedures/assessment criteria.
This instruction was first issued in June 1995 and underwent major
revision in May 2000 to more closely align it with the provisions of the newly issued
CJCSI 3 170.01 A. One of the more significant modifications was the detailing of the
methodology to be utilized in developing KPPs derived from IERs, based on the format of
integrated architecture products described in the C4ISR Architecture Framework.
b) Assistant Secretary ofDefense as DoD CIO
CJCSI 62 12.0 IB outlines several of the oversight and review
responsibilities within the acquisition process. The Assistant Secretary of Defense
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(Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) is designated to serve as the
DoD Chief Information Officer in accordance with the Information Technology
Management Reform Act of 1996 (also known as Clinger-Cohen). ASD(C3I), serving as
DoD CIO, is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for ensuring the cost-effective use of
information technology. In this capacity, ASD(C3I) is assigned overarching
responsibility for ensuring the interoperability of all information technology and national
security systems throughout DoD. This places the CIO function in a position of sufficient
authority to ensure that interoperability and standardization programs are complied with
throughout DoD as well as focusing on the minimization and elimination of duplicate
technologies between the different Components/Services/Agencies (C/S/As).
C. PLANNING, PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING SYSTEM (PPBS)
Interoperability is problematic within the PPBS for several reasons, all of which
point back to the most basic of questions: "Who's going to pay for it?" There are definite
costs associated with interoperability, such as the expense of complying with standards
and specifications that the individual service components responsible for funding the
program do not understand nor see the need for, or for the identification of the many
different systems a program will need to be tested against to obtain joint certification.
While interoperability is certainly not free, it stands to reason its cost is much
lower if it is considered early during the design phase rather than trying to retrofit it in
after the fact, and as has been seen repeatedly, the lack of interoperability has its own
associated costs, often much higher than the up-front amounts that historically decision-
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makers have been hesitant to justify. What we are willing to pay for interoperability
should be linked to the overall value it enables, but this has rarely been the case.
Detail Available
MSO MSI MS II MS III
MNS ORD Engineering/ Production/
Manufacturing Fielding
Figure 2-2, "Cost" of Interoperability
While the ability to accurately identify and assess the costs associated with
interoperability (or the lack thereof) is problematic, the true crux of the funding
conundrum is found within the overall acquisition process itself. The individual DoD
service components are the actors responsible for designing, managing, and funding
programs. However, often services do not tacitly acknowledge the requirement for
"jointness" in its systems, especially if the system does not exhibit interoperability
problems within the component's own vertical operational environment.
Another issue that must be considered is the lack of responsiveness within the
PPBS itself. Within the framework of the current Program Objective Memorandum
25
(POM) cycle there exists a three-year lag in obtaining budget approval for new program
starts. This delay is benign when dealing with large, industrial end-item procurements
such as tanks and planes, but it is fundamentally incompatible with the rapid pace of
change seen in information technology. While this is a broader problem than just
interoperability, the PPBS process can become a serious impediment to implementing
policy even when such policy can be identified and agreed upon. One proposed
recommendation to alleviate this situation has been to implement an Interoperability
Program Element within the Future Years Defense Program, creating a direct line of
funding for interoperability initiatives that is beyond the parochial control of the
component acquisition communities. 11
D. STANDARDIZATION AND ARCHITECTURAL INITIATIVES
1. Defense Information Infrastructure Common Operating Environment
a) DII COE Background
The Defense Information Infrastructure Common Operating Environment
(DII COE) is an open architecture designed around the client-server model, analogous to
the Microsoft Windows "plug-n-play" paradigm. It provides a set of "off-the-shelf
components and programming standards that describe how to add new functionality to
the common environment. The DII COE concept is best described as an architecture that
provides an approach for building interoperable systems, a collection of reusable software
1
1
Nutwell, Robert, RADM, DASD(C3ISR&S). "New Interoperability Policies and Processes'
Presentation.
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components, and a software infrastructure for supporting mission area applications. The
technical architecture developed for GCCS provided the guide for development of the DII
COE. All DoD C4I systems and system upgrades are to be DII COE compliant, as
outlined in a USD(AT&L) memorandum from August 1996. 12 This memorandum also
mandates the use of the Joint Technical Architecture, which references the DII COE as a
specific implementation of the JTA that will continue to evolve in compliance with all
applicable specifications, standards, and source references.
b) DII COE Components
The DII COE concept is based on a comprehensive definition of the
runtime execution environment via a collection of implemented software components.
DII COE establishes a methodology for modular software reuse as well as a set of
application program interfaces for accessing compliant components. One of the primary
DII COE elements is known as the Shared Data Environment (SHADE). SHADE is
responsible for data services and other data-related infrastructure that implement sets of
shared schema, data management and data access services, build/run-time tools, and
technical guidance for supporting COE-based mission applications. 13 The objective of
SHADE is to migrate DII COE away from redundant and/or dissimilar data stores to
12 Kaminski, Paul, USD(A&T). "Implementation of the DoD Joint Technical Architecture". DoD
Memorandum dtd 22 Aug 96. http://coeeng.ncr.disa.mil/REFERENCE PAGES/LEV.HTM
13 Center for Computer Systems Engineering Information Clearinghouse. Shared Data Environment
SHADE, http://dii-sw.ncr.disa.mil/shade/
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establish a standardized set of data services built from compliant components that blend
multiple data technologies. The Extensible Markup Language (XML) and Simple Object
Access Protocol (SOAP) are examples of emerging commercial standards being
considered by DII COE to assist in achieving SHADE.
c) DII COE Issues
Drawing on the Windows analogy, the concept of a common operating
environment is not as encompassing as it might at first appear. Just as the Windows
"plug-n-play" capability certainly has its advantages, it also is not without
implementation issues. Interoperability, when viewed from the perspective of interface
verification and compliance, should not be considered the conclusion of the integration
process but merely the beginning. Even when all individual one-to-one connections have
been tested, that does not imply that the SoS is going to function as required by the CRD
definition. When integrating C4I architectures, the whole is always different than the
sum of the parts. Traditionally, the individual characteristics of a system have been the
driving factor in acquisition, leading to the analogy of "stovepipe" development. The key
to improving the effectiveness of the SoS as a whole will be to shift the emphasis away
from how well a system works and towards how well a system works with other systems,
and then finally to how well all the systems work together to accomplish the mission they
were grouped together to achieve in the first place.
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2. Joint Technical Architecture
The JTA provides DoD systems with the fundamental technical foundation for
interoperability. The JTA is structured into service areas based on the TRM that define
the interfaces and protocol standards mandated for all developmental projects/existing
capabilities that produce, use, or exchange information in any form that electronically
crosses a functional or component boundary. Waivers to JTA compliance can only be
granted by the Component Acquisition Executive with concurrence from USD(AT&L)
viaASD(C3I).
The JTA is essentially a rigidly hierarchical, highly cross-referenced manual
document. In its current format, it has proven difficult to implement by designers and
programmers due to its inherently "computer-centric" (vice network-centric) focus and
ineffective in maintaining relevance to the dynamic commercial marketplace.
Alternatives to the JTA, such as object-oriented approaches to DBMS, distributed
computing, and programming continue to emerge, but until they are considered "mature
and stable" by the DoD Technical Architecture Steering Group they are simply
documented in an "Emerging Standards" section of the JTA and are only authorized for
use when not in conflict with existing standards. The term "architecture" in JTA is itself
somewhat of a misnomer. As a collection of protocols and standards to be complied with
the JTA is a relatively useful document; however, it does little to ensure that once
individual elements have been assembled into a system that implementation and
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functionality decisions will also support interoperability, thus the JTA becomes a part of
the puzzle, but not the entire solution.
3. DoD C4ISR Architecture Framework Version 2.1
a) General
The C4ISR Architecture Framework, first published in June 1996 by the
DoD Integration Task Force (later revised in July 1998 and again in July 2000), is
designed to address a widespread lack of understanding regarding software architecture,
often as a result of the use of imprecise terminology. The development of C4ISR
architectures is often a distributed process. C/S/As already develop different architectural
views for implementations that fall within their specific domains. A common framework
and guidance are crucial to achieving C4I interoperability because it is largely a matter of
management, design, and implementation discipline between these views rather than
simply of resolving technical issues. An interrelated perspective of how these individual
architectures combine in the conduct ofjoint operations does not yet exist in a centralized
location, but such a perspective must often be assembled based on emergent joint task
force requirements by integrating the various segments produced across DoD.
b) Architectural Views
The C4ISR Architecture Framework defines three descriptive (taxonomic)
"views": operational, systems, and technical. The Framework is an attempt to provide
guidance in this process of determining and facilitating interoperability amongst these
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architectural views. 14 In general, architectures provide a mechanism for understanding
and managing complexity. The purpose of C4ISR architectures is to improve the
developmental process by enabling the timely synthesis of requirements with fiscal
considerations, enabling the efficient production of improved operational capabilities. It
is important to note that the Framework is an architectural description vice an
architectural implementation. A description is a representation (blueprint) of a postulated
configuration, while an implementation is the process of transforming the description into
an actual capability. 15
The operational view is a description of the tasks, elements, and
information flows required to accomplish a specific military operation, as defined in the
CRD. Operational views define the type of information, frequency of exchange, and
tasks supported by the information exchanges. Operational architecture views are
generally not system-dependent.
The systems view is a graphical depiction of the interconnections
supporting warfighting functions, outlining physical connections such as nodes, circuits,
and networks. It specifies overall system as well as individual component performance
parameters (interoperability metrics), and shows architecturally how the multiple systems
within a CRD-defined mission area domain are linked. The systems architecture view
14 C4ISR Architecture Working Group Final Report.
http://www.c3i.osd.mil/org/cio/i3/AWG Digital Library/pdf/fhlrprt.pdf
15 Manley, James. "Analysis Results ofJCAPS Live Fire Test" Conducted by Joint Forces Program
Office". MITRE Corporation. December, 1999.
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associates physical resource attributes back to the operational view via standards defined
in the technical view.
The technical view is the minimal set of rules (services, interfaces, and
standards) governing the arrangement, interaction, and interdependence of elements that
ensure a conformant system is capable of satisfying a specified set of requirements.
Technical views comprise profiles constructed from enterprise specifications, such as





























Figure 2-3, Fundamental Architecture Linkages 16
16 DoD Architecture Framework Working Group. "DoD Architecture Framework Version 2.1, Volume I:
Definitions and Guidelines". 26 Jul 00.
32
To be consistent and integrated, an architecture description must provide
explicit linkages among its various views. These linkages provide a cohesive audit trail
from operational measures of effectiveness back to the supporting systems'
characteristics and specific technical criteria governing their acquisition and
development. The operational view describes the nature of these linkages in sufficient
detail to determine what specific degree of information exchange is required. The
systems view identifies which elements will be used and then compares the required
degree of interoperability against the capabilities of the postulated system. The technical
view articulates the criteria that should govern implementation of each individual element
to achieve the system's overall requirements.
c) Framework Components
The C4ISR Architecture Framework consists of four main components:
common definitions, common products, common building blocks, and universal
guidance. Common definitions that are used in relation to the three architecture views are
clarified and interrelated for understanding and standardization. The common products
are notional templates/representation formats that C/S/As will use to describe their C4ISR
architectures. Common products that must be developed regardless of specific
architecture purpose/scope are identified as "essential", such as the High-Level
Operational Concept Graphic, Operational Node Connectivity Description, and
Operational Information Exchange Matrix. Several common building blocks, also known
as universal reference resources, are included in the Framework. The system architect
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does not construct these products but must refer to them to be consistent with prevailing
universal guidance and criteria.
An associated product to the Framework is the C4ISR Core Architecture
Data Model (CADM). The CADM is complementary as a methodology for providing a
common schema for repositories of the architectural views produced by Framework. The
CADM provides flexible queries capability in determining the completeness and
consistency of the information found in the operational, systems, and technical views.
d) C4I Support Plans
An acquisition tool based upon the C4I Architecture Framework is known
as the C4I Support Plan. As soon as possible after Milestone (Approval to Conduct
Concept Studies), service components begin identifying C4I infrastructure and support
requirements to facilitate the analysis of alternatives during Phase I (Program Definition
and Risk Reduction). The purpose of a system's C4I Support Plan is to provide a source
of documentation that can be referenced against standardization protocols and compared
to baseline requirements, primarily during acquisition lifecycle phase transitions. 17 C4I
Support Plans contain progressively more detailed and specific time-phased descriptions
of the types of information needed by the developmental system, to include architectural
and information exchange requirements, security/connectivity issues, and infrastructure
and support shortfalls. This centralized repository allows Program Offices to identify and
17 Dean, Keith, OASD(C3I). "C4I Support Plans (C4ISP) Overview Brief. Presentation.
http://www.dsc.osd.mil/dsc/plans/C4ISP webpg/thebrief.pdf
34
document system support needs, inter-system dependencies, and interface requirements
early in the developmental cycle. Support Plans are required by DoD 5000.2-R for all
C4I systems, with waiver authority held at the ASD(C3I) level.
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III. INTEROPERABILITY CERTIFICATION
If DOD-wide policy alone were sufficient, we would all be
programming in Ada today.
LTC Drew Hamilton
Director, Joint Forces Program Office
A. CERTIFICATION PROCESS
1. Introduction
As a result of the GAO findings discussed in Chapter I, several regulations and
instructions have been implemented as well as a variety of organizational entities
created/modified. One of the most significant developments brought about was the
concept of certification testing. While this certification process has been a considerable
step forward in promoting interoperability, it still provides only part of the solution to the
overall interoperability question.
In March 2000 the Under-Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, &
Logistics) requested the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation Branch perform an
assessment of the current infrastructure supporting interoperability testing to identify
capability shortfalls and suggest needed improvements. DOT&E's report found that the
need for interoperability is usually acknowledged by the PMs, but detailed requirements,
specifically in the form of well-constructed Interoperability Key Performance Parameters
(I-KPPs), are generally deemed inadequate. 18 Interoperability testing was found to still
^Wallace, Clint, COL. "Preliminary Assessment of Adequacy of Infrastructure Resources to Support Test
and Evaluation of Interoperability". Presentation.
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concentrate more on examining technical interfaces than on determining the overall
mission effectiveness enabled by system interoperability. This ontological gap lies at the
heart of the entire interoperability problem. The fundamental question of "What are
interoperability requirements in the first place?" continues to go largely unanswered.
2. Certification and Milestone Decision Authorities
"Certification" is a critical step in the development of C4I systems. From the
earliest stages of a program's lifecycle, the eventual testing and evaluation of the new
system's interoperability must be carefully considered and included in the overall
acquisition strategy. The testing process culminates with the issuance of a certification
document that will be reviewed by a program's Milestone Decision Authority at
Milestone III (Production Approval). Depending on the acquisition category and dollar
threshold of the program, the MDA may be:
• USD(AT&L), with advice from the Defense Acquisition Board.
• ASD(C3I), with advice from the Major Automated Information System Review
Council.
• Component (such as CinC of a unified combatant command, service chief, or
DoD agency head).
The MDA has the responsibility for ensuring that joint interoperability is considered a
core competency in overall mission functionality of the system.
According to DoD 5000.2-R, "no new system or system under modification will
enter production and gain Initial Operational Capability (IOC) without certification".
This certification process also applies to acquisition programs not subject to a formal
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review process, such as ACTDs, COTS, and the CinC Initiative Program. The term
"system under modification" is rather ambiguously defined as having potential effect at
any level of the Open Systems Interconnection protocol.
3. Joint Staff J-6 and the Joint Interoperability Test Command
The J-6 is the organization with primary responsibility for ensuring compliance
with interoperability directives, and DISA's Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC)
is the DoD's sole interoperability certification agent. Certification by JITC to the J-6 is
confirmation that a C4I system has undergone appropriate level testing to determine if
applicable requirements for interoperability have been met and that the system is ready
for joint use. 19 JITC certification relies on:
• Review of C/S/A test planning documentation.
• Involvement in all interoperability-related portions of testing.
• Review of analyses prepared by participating test organizations.
• JITC participation in joint exercises, as necessary.
Factors to be considered in the JITC assessment include:
• Ability of the system to operate in a joint environment without degrading
operation of other systems or being degraded by them.
• Ability of systems to exchange information and services utilizing applicable
standard data elements and formats.
19 JITC Certification Process, http://iitc.ffau.disa.mil/testing/interop/interop.htm
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• Ability to interoperate in joint/combined environments without the use of
unapproved technical interface devices.
• Ability of systems to maintain required system confidentiality, integrity, and
availability.
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Figure 3-1, Interoperability Test/Certification Process20
J-6 ensures that all Mission Need Statements (MNSs), Capstone Requirements
Documents (CRDs), and Operational Requirements Documents (ORDs) produced by the
requirements generation system are in conformance with National Security Strategy and
Information Technology Services policy. J-6 examines all I-KPPs to determine that they
20 CJCS Instruction 62 12.0 IB. "Interoperability and Supportability of National Security Systems, and
Information Technology Systems". 08 May 00.
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have been accurately derived from the relevant Information Exchange Requirements
(IERs), thus providing a participatory function in the certification process while at the
same time reaffirming JITC's authority as certification agent. The thrust of J-6's
expanded role is to review and validate all CII system test certifications against




The Service Components are generally responsible for funding interoperability
certification testing for systems that have not reached IOC). Testing can be conducted by
service component test organizations or by JITC facilities during DT&E, OT&E, and/or
joint exercise environments. PMs are given the discretion to designate any qualified test
organization that best fits budgetary and developmental timeline constraints to conduct
interoperability testing. If not the actual agency to perform testing, JITC must still be
involved in the planning and execution of the applicable interoperability portions of the
Test Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP). This will insure the required information is
































Figure 3-2, TEMP Review Process21
2. Test Support
As soon as practicable in the acquisition process JITC should be involved to work
with the system proponent in developing an interoperability certification evaluation plan
(ICEP) that makes the most efficient use of limited testing assets. The ICEP outlines how
the system's interoperability will be evaluated against requirements in the ORD, C4I
Support Plan, and TEMP.
21 JIEO/JITC Circular 9002. "Requirements Assessment and Interoperability Certification of C4I and AIS





































Figure 3-3, Early Test Support22
During acquisition lifecycle Phase I (Concept Exploration) CII issues will be
addressed utilizing the critical operational issues (COIs) identified in the TEMP. The test
methodology to be employed must be designed to test end-to-end CII for the entire SoS.
Metrics developed for each interoperability COI must be stated in the ICEP, as well as
evaluation criteria and data requirements clearly defined. JITC will work with the
Component/Service/Agency (C/S/A) to ensure criteria are translated into testable items.
If a COI is not adequately addressed in the TEMP, the certification report to J-6 will state
what limitations caused the COI not to be resolved.
22 JIEO/JITC Circular 9002. "Requirements Assessment and Interoperability Certification of C4I and AIS
Equipment and Systems". 23 Jan 95.
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3. Test Review
Systems that have exhibited interoperability problems may be placed on a special
"watch list" overseen by J-6's Interoperability Policy Test Panel (IPTP), via the Joint


















































Figure 3-4, Critical Comment Resolution Procedures23
The mission of the IPTP is to develop DoD policy positions for Military
Communications Electronics Board (MCEB) consideration. The panel acts as the issue
resolution forum for interoperability testing and certification matters, to include
scheduling, prioritization, and resource conflicts. Additionally, the IPTP is the waiver
authority to the certification requirement. A temporary authorization, known as an IATO
(Interim Authority to Operate), may be granted in special situations, usually revolving
23 JIEO/JITC Circular 9002. "Requirements Assessment and Interoperability Certification of C4I and AIS
Equipment and Systems". 23 Jan 95.
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around test resource availability. IATOs are not to exceed one year nor can they be
extended or renewed.
In conjunction with the PM for the system that has been placed on the watch list,
JITC will provide periodic reviews to the IPTP based upon on-going operational testing
of the system's SoS. The IPTP will use these reviews to determine whether adequate
progress towards compliance with interoperability test policy and requirements has been
achieved in order for the system to be removed from the list. If adequate progress is not
achieved or the system is deemed mission-critical, it may be referred to the MCEB for
oversight. This is significant in that it empowers the joint constituents in the
requirements generation and certification process as well as ensuring the service
components do not unilaterally dictate funding decisions regarding interoperability. The
MCEB addresses such interoperability issues through two sub-panels. The
Interoperability Improvement Panel monitors C4I interoperability issues surfaced by
C/S/As, while the Interoperability Test Panel resolves testing disputes, such as appeals of
JITC certification decisions.
4. Certification Memorandum
At the conclusion of applicable portions of a system's test program, JITC provides
J-6 an interoperability test certification memorandum that is used as input into the
acquisition cycle's Milestone III (Production or Fielding/Deployment Approval). The
characterization of the memorandum will be based primarily on the performance of the
evaluated system's I-KPP. After receipt of JITC system test certification, J-6 will issue a
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validation notice to the respective C/S/As and test organizations, as well as forwarding









































Figure 3-5, JITC Certification24
C. CERTIFICATION TESTING ISSUES
1. Introduction
Interoperability certification testing has undergone significant changes since 1999
as a result of the publication of CJCSI 3 170.01 A. Prior to the "systems of systems"
concept, testing was primarily focused on one-to-one interface comparisons and
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standardization compliance. With the inclusion of the CRD concept into the
requirements generation process, not only was how well an individual element worked
with other elements evaluated, but also how well a pre-defined set of CRD SoS elements
functioned together to achieve an identifiable mission.
2. US Joint Forces Command
a) Role as Joint Integrator
Due to the increasing importance of joint operations the President's 1993
Unified Action Plan detailed significant changes to the mission and structure of the US
Atlantic Command (ACOM). ACOM was given the task of not only serving as CinC for
a geographic area of responsibility but to also fulfill the functional areas of providing,
training, and integrating all joint forces within the US military structure. Officially re-
designated the US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) in 1999 to better reflect the
importance of its new mission, it is the only CinC continuously tasked with providing
input to the JROC and the Defense Acquisition Board.
Implicit in this joint integration mandate, JFCOM assumed several
responsibilities in the area of interoperability. As executive agent for joint
experimentation, JFCOM' s observations are critical to the identification of
interoperability characteristics necessary to maintain the current qualitative superiority of
US forces, achieve the cohesion envisioned in the Joint Vision 2020 strategy, and shape
24 JIEO/JITC Circular 9002. "Requirements Assessment and Interoperability Certification of C4I and AIS
Equipment and Systems". 23 Jan 95.
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the overarching context for the military of the future. In this capacity JFCOM works
closely with C/S/As to identify and refine required capabilities and doctrinal issues. The
resulting recommendations often become the basis for conducting joint mission need
analyses leading to the development ofMNSs (and hence ORDs) and CRDs.
b) Role in Interoperability Process
JFCOM is specifically identified as the CJCS's advocate for joint
interoperability. As such, JFCOM provides the "warfighter" perspective during
development of joint operational concepts. As a member of the JROC, JFCOM is
involved with the formulation of recommendations by the MCEB regarding unresolved
interoperability certification issues for developmental and/or fielded systems. JFCOM
also coordinates with the Joint Staff J6 and ASD(C3I) who co-chair the Joint Operational
Architecture Working Group in the development of the C4ISR Joint Operational
Architecture.
As joint force "integrator" JFCOM is tasked with reviewing and
confirming the sufficiency of I-KPPs and IER matrices for all ORDs and CRDs. This
evaluation is based on the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) and Joint Mission-Essential
Task List (JMETL) assessment process. JFCOM operational testing in support of JITC
certification often involves assembling appropriate forces representative of the CRD's
SoS in a joint exercise environment. As a result of this redirection of emphasis away
from "one-to-one" testing, newly developed metrics used for assessing compliance and
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SoS effectiveness now include both mission-based results as well as interface standards
compliance inputs.
E3 Denotes a Process Change element dj> Denotes a "Field or Fix" Decision
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Figure 3-6, Outcome-Based Interoperability Process25
c) Joint Command and Control Integration/Interoperability Group
At the suggestion of the Defense Science Board ASD(C3I) established the
Joint Command and Control Integration and Interoperability Group (JC2I2G) in
November 1998. Two months later the JC2I2G established CinC Interoperability
Program Offices (CIPOs) at three different system commands locations:
25 Zavin, Jack, OSD. "Achieving Joint and Combined Interoperability: A Strategic Process". Presentation.
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• Communications and Electronics Command (CECOM), Fort Monmouth.
• Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR), San Diego.
• Electronics Systems Center, Hanscom AFB.
The purpose of the CIPOs is to organize CinC positions regarding interoperability
development issues. Along with the CIPOs, a Joint Forces Program Office (JFPO) was
also established to provide horizontal integration of the CIPOs' efforts. In addition to
focusing on cross-service interoperability, the JFPO is also involved with JTA technical
compliance issues.
These organizational entities support JFCOM in its role as joint integrator
during the requirements generation process. When faced with assessing interoperability
key performance parameters and/or supporting milestone decisions, JFCOM will
typically initiate the review process. The cognizant CIPO for the MNS/ORD/CRD being
examined will review joint as well as service component requirements. As discussed
previously, JITC will assess the testability of the requirements, while the JFPO
coordinates CIPO efforts as well as providing reviews of technical requirements.
3. Spiral Development and the Open Systems Approach
The requirements generation system defines the time-phased aspect of the PPBS
to support a spiral (evolutionary) developmental approach to acquisition. One of the
implications observed in implementing this methodology is that when interoperability is
an area of emphasis, an iterative approach becomes more successful than the classic
"waterfall" process.
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As the CII process progresses, individual system capabilities will often need to be
modified repeatedly to better accommodate overall requirements. Spiral development is a
streamlined acquisition strategy well suited to automated information systems that seeks
to field a core capability based on a modular "open source" design, thus allowing ease of
implementation for future increments in capability upgrades.26
Open source design is an initiative that began within the commercial software
sector that seeks to ensure interoperability among systems procured by different
acquisition organizations and developed by different vendors by utilizing common
interfaces based on accepted industry standards. Open systems implement sufficient
standards for interfaces, services, and supporting formats to enable properly engineered
components to be utilized across SoSs with minimal changes, to interoperate with other
components on local and remote systems, and to interact with users in a style that
facilitates portability.21 Open systems are characterized by well-defined non-proprietary
interfaces and protocols that have been adopted by recognized standardization
organizations as well as the commercial marketplace. Open source design implies that all
aspects of a SoS's interfaces have been adequately defined to facilitate inclusion of new,
additional, or higher performance system capabilities, a concept also known as
scalability.
2° Forsberg, Kevin, Mooz, Hal, & Cotterman, Howard. Visualizing Project Management. John Wiley &
Sons, Inc. 1996.
27 DoD Architecture Framework Working Group. "DoD Architecture Framework Version 2.1, Volume I:
Definitions and Guidelines". 26 Jul 00.
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Many current interoperability problems are the result of poor configuration
control over systems that were "interoperable" when originally fielded. Interoperability
is a constant process throughout a system's total life cycle, a consideration not often
accounted for in budgetary and maintenance planning. As this requirement becomes
increasingly recognized and accepted it provides another reason for information system
acquisition strategies to migrate towards the evolutionary spiral-type development cycle,
meaning that all requirements, to include interoperability, can have continuous visibility.
4. Interoperability Certification Challenges
A potential danger exists in becoming too focused on interoperability for
interoperability's sake. Arguably, universal interoperability is prohibitively expensive, in
time, effort, and technological capability. The so-called "80% solution" can be
effectively applied to interoperability, but only when the requirements generation and
CRD definition processes provide a valid foundation to adequately frame interoperability
trade-off decisions (i.e. where to divide the 80% and the 20%).
While the certification process has undoubtedly furthered the state of
interoperability and the capabilities of C4I systems, "certification" should not be
construed as a guarantee. Certification only implies that the system is in compliance with
the most current standardization protocols and that its IERs and I-KPPs are congruent
with those of its associated CRD SoS. The thrust of the certification effort is still focused
on the operational testing of one-to-one interfaces within the identified SoS elements.
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After a system receives certification, significant problems not identified during
testing can arise during its implementation in the less-controlled operational environment.
Often, especially during Joint Task Force scenarios, systems are used in ways not
previously envisioned. While a system may receive J-6 certification and be approved for
production, it will in all likelihood have not been tested against all systems with which it
may eventually interoperate, further illustrating the flaw in "interface-only" approaches to
testing. As CRD SoSs continue to evolve and emerge, the continuity of the
interoperability requirements initiated during the ORD IER process must also be
maintained to complete the needs/requirements/capability cycle and to give certification a
relevant foundation.
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IV. INTEROPERABILITY TOOLS
Imagine that your automobile was completely disassembled
and laid out on your driveway. All the elements
individually would be just as before, all in working order.
But you would have no transportation. Transportation, the
unique system function, only exists when all the elements
are connected together and function as a whole.
Eberhardt Rechtin
Systems Architecting: Creating
and Building Complex Systems
A. INTRODUCTION
In the past few years there has been no shortage of rhetoric regarding the virtues
of interoperability. Even the doctrinal publication Joint Vision 2020 calls for renewed
emphasis in this area. However, all such good intentions are for naught until we have
determined the capabilities of the actual tools required for developing, assessing, and
diagnosing interoperable systems. This chapter discusses the most promising of these
tools, what they can do, and who should be using them. This examination will present
two architectural tools: the Joint C4ISR Architecture Plannning/Analysis System
(JCAPS) and the Marine Air-Ground Task Force C4I Systems Technical Architecture and
Repository (MSTAR), as well as two assessment tools: the Level of Information Systems
Interoperability (LISI) and the Joint Maritime Tool for Interoperability Risk Assessment
(JMTIRA).
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B. JOINT C4ISR ARCHITECTURE PLANNING/ANALYSIS SYSTEM
1. Introduction
JCAPS is an automated software application designed to support the effort of
strategic-level planning and resource management by facilitating the comparison,
contrast, and integration of C4ISR architectures. JCAPS utilizes standardized
application-level data as well as providing connectivity to other SHADE-compliant
architecture data repositories. The JCAPS tool helps replace paper-based documentation
with architecture information that can be published, queried, summarized, and most
importantly, used to achieve C4ISR integration. The JCAPS database holds a core set of
common C4ISR architectural data, providing the user with an interactive, distributed, and
networked C4ISR architecture planning tool. This capability will help simplify the
migration of legacy architectures into new operational, systems, and technical
architectural models. JCAPS will also provide operational users a powerful tool in
designing ad-hoc architectures as well as a system configuration management tool. The
current release of JCAPS employs the guidance and methodologies found in C4ISR
Architecture Framework Version 2.O.28
2. JCAPS System Configuration
JCAPS employs a three-tiered client/server architecture, packaged in the
following ways:
28 DoD Architecture Framework Working Group. "DoD Architecture Framework Version 2.1, Volume I:
Definitions and Guidelines". 26 Jul 00.
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• As a software component supporting the presentation tier.
• A software component supporting the server tier.
• A software component supporting a data storage tier.
JCAPS operates on a Windows NT platform and supports the exchange of data between
clients and servers using an Oracle 8i database. This three-tiered architecture will allow
JCAPS to operate as a stand-alone or networked application.
JCAPS has the ability to share data through replication. This will allow users to
work in JCAPS in a collaborative environment. This is ideal for hot-washes following
major exercises or deployments where CINCs can articulate their real world operations to
the JCAPS central node. This replication will also allow data sharing with such systems
as Linked Operations Intelligence Centers Europe, Battlefield Information Collection and
Exploitation Systems, and GCCS.28
• Interface with the server tier to retrieve and display data. No direct access to the
database server is available.
• All data edited is buffered and passed on to the server tier.
• Responsible for retrieving all required data to pass on to the presentation tier.
• Responsible for retrieving all required data from the presentation tier to pass on
to the data storage tier.
28 JCAPS Homepage, https://extranet.if.afrl.mil/icaps extra/
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Contains all the algorithms for the manipulation and processing of data that is





• The repository for stored procedures in support of the presentation tier and server
tier.
• Stored procedures will be responsible for all business rules and data access,
including insert, update, and delete. This will enforce data integrity and the
security access required within JCAPS.
• Provides role-based dynamic views for independent read-only access by non-
JCAPS front-end tools.
Figure 4-1, JCAPS Three-Tiered Functionality29
3. JCAPS Development
The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense is developing JCAPS in response
to the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996 that required agency-
wide architecture modeling. The utilization ofJCAPS ensures that vertical and horizontal
traceability and interoperability exists between and among C4ISR Information Systems
and their information exchange requirements. The MNS for JCAPS states: "The need for
automated cross-architecture analysis from a common information and knowledge base is
required to develop coherent, commonly understood "Go-To-War" capabilities for all
echelons and to improve DoD information technology acquisition decisions". The
JCAPS prototype is currently being evaluated by major geographic and functional
29 JCAPS Users Manual, Prototype Version 2.1, 1 August, 2000.
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CINCs, along with all primary Components/Services/Agencies (C/S/As). It is expected
that the final Version 2.1 will be ready for release in early 200 1.30
4. Summary
JCAPS integrates a variety of powerful technological resources resulting in a
broad range of potential users. These resources include the ability to exchange data in a
shared environment over a global network, visual drawing tools, graphical information
system mapping technology, and the ability to depict all three architectural views.
JCAPS provides DoD planners and operators the ability to rapidly prototype, modify and
design real-world architectures in a common environment from a centralized database.
C. MAGTF C4I SYSTEMS TECHNICAL ARCHITECTURE AND
REPOSITORY
1. Introduction
In 1998 the Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) tasked the
C4I Directorate with consolidating Marine Corps Operational, Systems and Technical
Architectures into a common data repository that could be updated continuously while
serving as the central location for all C4ISR technical and programmic information. Prior
to 2000, the Marine Corps relied on static PowerPoint depictions of its operational and
systems architectures. There did not exist an automated repository for technical
architecture data. Access to operational and system architectures could only be gained
30 JCAPS Homepage, https://extranet.if.afrl.mil/jcaps extra/
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through the Concepts Division of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command
(MCCDC).
In response to this tasking the C4I Directorate began developing MSTAR.
Logicon, a subsidiary of Northrop Grumman, is the primary contractor for the MSTAR
system (as well as JCAPS). MSTAR will be the Marine Corps' central automated
repository for all C4I graphical and schematic architecture depictions. MSTAR has a
drill-down capability that allows the user varying levels of granularity in the architectural
views. In addition, MSTAR incorporates a suite of drawing tools to assist in maintaining
and developing new architectures. MSTAR will also have the ability to assess
interoperability by utilizing the embedded LISI Inspector Tool. MSTAR has the
capability to link systems in the architecture to their programmatic information via the
Command Acquisition Programs System (CAPS). This feature gives users the capability
to see cost, schedule and program -specific information of each system in order to
enhance the C4I operational planning process.
2. MSTAR System Characteristics
a) MSTAR Processes
Like JCAPS, MSTAR also conforms to the guidelines of the C4ISR
Architecture Framework Version 2.0. MARCORSYSCOM's System Engineering and
Integration Team's architecture development group has outlined six primary functions for
MSTAR:
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• Architecture Development is done in MSTAR through graphical depictions in
the client interface. Updates to these depictions are currently only done by
MARCORSYSCOM.
• Interoperability Engineering is accomplished primarily through the LISI
Inspector Tool that has been embedded into the MSTAR system. This tool can
conduct interoperability assessments of both stand-alone systems and operational,
system, and technical architecture models.
• Information Assurance is accomplished by using the MSTAR repository to track
MARCORSYSCOM accreditation of recommended systems.
• Technology Transition can be tracked using the LISI tool and MSTAR
repository to measure the impact of new systems on various architectures.
• Joint Liaison can be accomplished by linking the MSTAR system to other
services' C4ISR repositories.
• Systems Integration is done similar to technology transition in that LISI and
technical information in the repository are used to assess the impact ofnew
systems and facilitate their insertion into current architectures.
b) Physical Characteristics
Again similar to JCAPS, MSTAR is based on a three-tiered client/server
architecture running Oracle 8i in a Windows NT 4.0 operating environment. The Client
tier is available through any standard TCP/IP web browser, in both NIPRNET and
SIPRNET versions. The Applications tier consists of architectural models supported by
two drawing application servers known as Aperture and SmartPicture. Oracle's
Developer, Forms, Reports, and ColdFusion servers support database repository
functions, including dynamic query and DBMS functionality. The Data tier consists of
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the MSTAR repository, LISI operational database, and the LISI "playground" (input)
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Figure 4-2, MSTAR Three-Tier Architecture.
c) MSTAR Summary
MSTAR is intended to be the central '^warehouse" for all Marine Corps
C4ISR Architectural Framework information, acquisition development documentation,
and individual system interoperability assessments. Concepts Division will continue to
coordinate the MNS/ORD process with Requirements Division at MCCDC for all
systems that make up the C4I operational architectures of the Marine Corps. The C4ISR
31 USMC Digitization-C4ISR Near Term Architecture and Efforts Briefing, C4ISR Directorate,
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Directorate, MARCORSYSCOM is the keeper of all the systems and technical
architectures within the MSTAR repository. Changes to any of the operational, system or
technical architectures must be approved by MCCDC and MARCORSYSCOM
respectively. Eventually MSTAR will be a tool that warfighters as well as developers
will have access to. Initially, operational forces will be able to enter information using
the C4ISR Technical Issues forum ofMSTAR and the LISI Inspector Tool Questionnaire.
MSTAR is a significant step forward in the effort to improve C4ISR system integration
and interoperability by C4ISR program developers.
D. LEVELS OF INFORMATION SYSTEM INTEROPERABILITY
1. Introduction
One of the realizations made by DoD was that as an organization it lacked an
overarching discipline to recognize different levels of sophistication that logically apply
in conducting various system-to-system information exchanges. Such a construct,
otherwise known as a "maturity model", would provide the basis for DoD architects to
reflect operational differences appropriately, and for MNSs and ORDs to better reflect the
desires of the warfighter. LISI was designed to be such a model. Originated by the
Intelligence Systems Council in 1993, its scope was significantly expanded in 1996 by
the C4ISR Integration Task Force (later handed off to the C4ISR Architecture Working
Group). The MITRE Corporation has been the primary industry developer of the LISI
model as well as the web-based LISI Inspector Tool.
MARCORSYSCOM, 24 April 2000.
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2. LISI Models
The purpose of LISI is to provide DoD with a maturity model and process for
determining joint interoperability needs, to assist in the assessment of our information
systems in meeting those needs, and in selecting pragmatic solutions and transition paths
for achieving higher states of capability and interoperability.
LISI is composed of three different types of models. The LISI Interoperability
Maturity Model defines the five levels of system-to-system interoperability in progressive
levels of sophistication. The LISI Reference Model characterizes these same levels in
terms of four comprehensive and integrated attributes: procedures, applications,
infrastructure, and data (PAID). The third model is the LISI Capabilities Model. It
defines specific capability thresholds as they relate to PAID in attaining each LISI level.
This model provides the detail required in determining system interoperability profiles
and metrics, and provides the basic procedural framework for conducting LISI
interoperability assessments.32
3. Interoperability Capability Maturity Model
The LISI Interoperability CMM identifies and. assesses the stages through which
systems progress in order to improve their capabilities to interoperate. LISI can then be
used as guide for PMs to improve a system's capability to interoperate with other systems
or with specific systems called for in a mission-based architecture.
32 Levels of Information System Interoperability Report, C4ISR Architecture Working Group, Department
of Defense, 30 March 1998.
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Figure 4-3, LISI Capability Maturity Model
The following provides a brief overview ofthe characteristics of each CMM level:
• Level (Isolated) generally indicates that a system is stand-alone and either
cannot or should not interoperate with other systems (in other words no electronic
connection is allowed or is possible).
• Level 1 (Connected) indicates that the system is connected electronically to
another system and that they are able to perform some form of simple exchange
such as messaging or e-mail. Decision-makers can exchange one-dimensional
information but have little capability to ruse information together to support
decision-making.
• Level 2 (Functional) indicates that the system is part of a local network with
increasingly complex exchanges of information using protocols and some form of
formal data model. Decision-makers are able to share fused information between
svstems of functions.
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Level 3 (Domain) indicates the systems are capable of being connected over a
network. Information at this level is shared between independent applications.
Domain data models facilitate direct database-to-database interactions. Systems
at this level support group collaboration on fused information products.
Level 4 (Enterprise) indicates that systems are capable of interoperating in a
global environment across multiple domains. Data and applications are folly
shared and can be distributed throughout to support information fusion. Data has
a common interpretation regardless of form, and applies across the entire
enterprise.

























Figure 4-4, PAID Attributes
a) Procedures
The Procedures attribute is broken down into four categories:
• Standards. Standards are all the technical standards defined bv industry
organizations, such as IEEE and ISO, as well as various military standards, such
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as the JTA and DII COE.
• Management. Management is defined as all aspects of program development,
requirements definition, and acquisition/fielding lifecycles.
• Security. Security within procedures is addressed as whether or not systems are
compatible regarding access. For example, if one system is classified secret and
another is classified top secret, these two systems cannot communicate without
restriction.
• Operations. Operations, as it applies to the procedures attribute, involves the
determination by qualified personnel on how systems will be used in
accomplishment of the mission.
b) Applications
The applications attribute encompasses the fundamental purpose and
function for which any system is built - its mission. The functional requirements
specified by users to perform any operational activity are the very essence of the software
application. As with the other attributes of interoperability, software applications
demonstrate increasing levels of sophistication as they progress upward with the
interoperability maturity levels. At the low end, stand-alone applications such as word
processors provide a type of discrete functionality. At the mid-range, client-server based
applications provide a means for data separation - that is, information is not formatted for
use by only a single function; it is accessible in a common format from a commercial
database environment. At the higher end, applications are designed for cross discipline or
cross-organizational boundaries where common data definitions are required to provide
the semantic understanding of the information being shared. Finally, at the highest
maturity level of interoperability, the need for duplicate functions and applications is
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reduced or eliminated through common understanding and a "system of systems" may
now emerge with the ability to function using a global, integrated, information space.
c) Infrastructure
Infrastructure is the attribute that supports the establishment and use of a
connection between systems or applications. This connection may be a simple, extremely
low-level exchange (e.g., transfer of removable media between systems where no
electronic connection actually exists), or it could consist of wireless IP networks,
operating at multiple security levels. These examples show the breadth of the
communications and hardware aspects represented by infrastructure in the Reference
Model. Infrastructure also includes "system services", items that facilitate interactions,
such as communication protocol stacks and object request brokers that are used by
functions to establish and affect interactions between systems. The security devices and
technical capabilities that are used to implement the security elements of the Procedures
attribute also make up a part of infrastructure.
d) Data
The data attribute of interoperability focuses on the information processed
by the system. This attribute deals with both the format (syntax) and its content
(semantics). It includes all the forms of data that support every level of a system's
operation. The data attribute embodies the entire range of information styles and formats,
to include free text, formatted text, databases, video, sound, imagery, and graphical
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information. As such, the data attribute is the most critical aspect of attaining systems
interoperability.33
5. LISI Reference Model
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Control
Independent Private
Figure 4-5, LISI Reference Model
The LISI Reference Model is the foundation of the LISI process. The rows of the
LISI Reference Model are the five LISI interoperability levels, the columns representing
the four PAID attributes. This matrix provides the broad framework for classifying the
degree of capability exhibited by individual information systems. This model also
provides the common vocabulary and structure needed to discuss interoperability between
33Levels of Information System Interoperability Report, C4ISR Architecture Working Group, Department
of Defense, 30 March 1998.
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systems. Although each PAID attribute must be considered in defining a specific level of
interoperability, the significance and relative impact of the contributions from each
attribute varies by level. Though attainment of a specific level's capabilities prescribed
across PAID is the ultimate goal, one attribute can emerge as a primary enabler for
achieving each level of interoperability while the other three attributes tend to provide
"supporting" contributions. Understanding the influence between these attributes is
critical. The complexity of these relationships illustrates the increasing difficulty of
defining the interoperability battlespace. This understanding assists in determining where
and how critical resources can be applied to improve future C4I systems development,
procurement, and employment.
a) LISILevel-0
The primary enabler of Level-0 interoperability is Procedures.
Procedures must exist to permit interaction between disparate systems, usually via human
interface. Applications do not come into play at this level. Infrastructure is largely
independent systems with no connectivity other than physically transportable media, such




Figure 4-6, Isolated Interoperability in a Manual Environment
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b) LISILevel-1
The primary enabler of Level- 1 interoperability is Infrastructure.
Infrastructure provides the physical link between the systems that allows data to flow
from one system to another, typically via an electronic connection. This does not
necessarily mean that the two systems will be able to exchange information, primarily
because protocols at this level of interoperability are extremely low level. The
Procedures attribute is characterized by local and site -level procedures. Applications at
this level commonly relate to the simple exchange of information electronically. The
Data attribute is generally restricted to simple homogeneous data product formats.
tt v-ft>7r«r» Telnet, FTP,
E-Mail, Chatter
Figure 4-7, Connected Interoperability in a Peer-to-Peer Environment
c) LISILevel-2
The primary enabler at this level is Applications. Programs are able to
effectively process the information exchanged. Message formats, office suites, and web
browsers are examples of this type of interoperability, with TCP/IP and other advanced
protocols being introduced at this level. Level-2 is the lowest level that is considered to
be DII COE compliant. Infrastructure at this level makes the transition from peer-to-peer
to many-to-many connections. Data is characterized by duplicate sub-domain databases
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containing heterogeneous information, utilizing metadata definitions and conversion
protocols such as ODBC.
i
HTTP, NITF, ..
Figure 4-8, Functional Interoperability in a Distributed Environment
d) LISILevel-3
The primary enabler of Level-3 interoperability is Data. The Data
attribute at this level directs the use of shared databases without data translation, re-
mapping, or duplication within a function. Common data definitions, XML and related
technologies, and functional/physical data models enable this capability. Procedures at
this level are characterized by how well a system conforms to domain-based mission
doctrine. This is an area where conflict in the joint environment can occur and is often
the most difficult barrier to interoperability while having little to do with the other PAID
attributes. Applications that support group collaboration and shared data are present at
this level, focused on integration either across organizational or doctrinally defined
boundaries. The Infrastructure attribute at this level displays the ability to transition from
a LAN to a WAN environment. A domain model that allows direct database exchanges
characterizes the Data attribute at this level. This level is comprised of domain-defined
data models, dictionaries and standard data elements. Level-3 data is consolidated into
shared assets that are correlated and loosely fused, or integrated, by using middle-ware.
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NIDR, Common Displays, Shared




Figure 4-9, Domain Interoperability in an Integrated Environment
e) LISILevel-4
The primary enabler of Level-4 has cycled back around to Procedures.
Agreements must first be reached on enterprise-wide functions, activities, and operational
procedures that cross domain-level doctrine and definitions to ultimately allow universal
interoperability. To assess how well a system meets Level-4 requirements is to look at
systems documentation (MNS, CRD, and ORD) for the degree of "jointness" to which
the system will act across boundaries. Applications at this level are focused on the
elimination of duplicative functions and redundant applications via object-level software
and component-based architectures. Infrastructure becomes multi-dimensional,
advancing over the standard WAN structure by utilizing such techniques as Point-to-
Point Tunneling Protocol, protocol wrapping, and Quality of Service mechanisms. An
enterprise-wide model that is comprised of universally accepted data models, dictionaries
and standard data elements characterizes the Data attribute at this level (i.e. SHADE is
fully implemented).34
34 Levels of Information System Interoperability Report, C4ISR Architecture Working Group, Department




Figure 4-10, Enterprise Interoperability in a Universal Environment



































































































Figure 4-11, LISI Capabilities Model
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The LISI Capabilities Model further decomposes the Reference Model to provide
a more quantitative assessment of interoperability. As technology evolves the LISI
Capabilities Model will evolve also. The LISI 97 Capabilities Model is based on the state
of technology and conservative projections as of 1997, and defines the specific thresholds
required for attaining each level of interoperability.
What distinguishes this model from the LISI Reference Model is the
establishment of sub-levels. For example, the applications attribute displays three
specific sub-level thresholds: systems at Level la and Level lb provide simple access or
limited-exchange interactions; systems at Level lc support limited data transfers; and
systems at Level Id provide basic messaging. All of these capabilities represent basic,
connected Level- 1 interoperability, showing a distinct progression in sophistication and
capabilities present within the Connected Peer-to-Peer level for applications.
7. LISI Threshold Rules
The idea of thresholds is vital to how a LISI level is stated. In order to be
assessed at a certain level, systems must fulfill all of the requirements identified within
the PAID attributes up to the level attained. In effect, the LISI level attained by a system
is the "highest line" across PAID up to which all of the requisite PAID capabilities have
been implemented and whose implementations have been assessed as interoperable.
Decisions about which thresholds within each attribute are essential or can be
treated as inherited are embodied within a rules table. The conditions captured within
this table are the reflection of asserting two basic rules:
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• Threshold Rule 1 : Within the capabilities model, there are explicit, essential
capabilities that every system must possess. These capabilities act as barriers to
being rated at a higher level until they are accomplished.
• Threshold Rule 2: Within the capabilities model, thresholds are considered as
being "credited" to the next higher level if they have not been designated as an
essential, required capability as defined in Rule 1
.
Essentially these threshold rules determine that a system cannot be rated Level 2a
until all attributes of PAID have met the criteria that level; thus if the procedures attribute
is Level lc, the highest overall rating the system can receive is also Level lc.
8. Applying the LISI Capability Model
The LISI Capabilities Model provides the basis for assessing and comparing
systems. Using the model described above as a reference, the individual attributes and
capabilities of a system can be captured. Recording these attributes generates
Interoperability Profiles for each assessed system or application. In effect, this creates a
system-unique profile that shows only those capabilities that a particular system
possesses across PAID.
There are three characterization metrics used to express the interoperability level
of information systems: Generic, Expected, and Specific. The Generic level of
interoperability is the highest level at which the full suite of capabilities is implemented
in a given system. The Expected level of interoperability is determined by theoretically
comparing (via the Inspector tool) the Generic levels of any two systems. The Specific
level of interoperability is determined by comparing each system's specific
implementation choices, as exhibited during the actually test and evaluation process. The
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Specific level observed may be lower, equal to, or higher than the Expected level. In
summary, Generic and Expected levels are obtained by comparing capabilities, while
Specific levels are determined by comparing implementation choices.
9. LISI Inspector
Inspector is a tool for capturing, manipulating, and analyzing information system
characteristics in context with any coordinate-based reference model, such as the LISI
Capabilities Model, DII COE Runtime Environment Compliance Levels, or ISO Protocol
Stacks.35 The Inspector database receives input via system survey questionnaires,
typically initiated and maintained by the individual Program Offices. Pre-defined query
reports include:
• Generic Interoperability Profile (single system).
• Specific Interoperability Assessment Matrix (system-to-system).
• Composite Interoperability Assessment Matrix (multiple systems - ad hoc
configurations).
• System Interconnection Tables.
• Interoperability Attribute Comparison Tables.
The combination of the LISI model and the web-based functionality of the
Inspector tool shows promise in assisting in both the development and employment of
information system interoperability. However, its potential has yet to be realized due to
35 DoD Architecture Framework Working Group. "DoD Architecture Framework Version 2.1, Volume I:
Definitions and Guidelines". 26 Jul 00.
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lack of guidance and acceptance on the part of the PMs who are responsible for
populating its database.
E. JOINT MARITIME TOOL FOR INTEROPERABILITY RISK
ASSESSMENT
1. Purpose and Scope
One of the benefits of the Y2K crisis was the extensive testing of information
systems. While Y2K compliance was of paramount concern, it also provided the
opportunity for a more overarching assessment of DoD C4ISR systems in general, and
several new tools were developed for Y2K testing that can be used in the interoperability
effort. One of these tools is the Joint Maritime Tool for Interoperability Risk Assessment
(JMTIRA), developed by SPAWAR Charleston. Originally designed as a group of
application metrics used to conduct Y2K end-to-end (E-to-E) risk assessment testing,
SPAWAR has been tasked with further developing it as a tool for measuring risk in
C4ISR systems interoperability
JMTIRA is based on the concept of "emergence". In the study of complex
systems, the idea of emergence is used to indicate the arising of patterns, structures, or
properties that do not seem adequately explained by referring only to the system's pre-
existing components and their interaction. In other words, a systems rather than
piecemeal approach will be required to assess interoperability risk factors by reducing the
associated uncertainty for architects as well as warfighters.36
36 Joint Maritime Tool for Interoperability Risk Assessment Brief to Naval Postgraduate School by
SPAWAR Charleston SC, 25 May 2000.
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2. Interoperability Risk Assessment
The primary purpose of a fully mature JMTIRA tool is to provide a commander
with a risk assessment of C4ISR system interoperability, identifying what potential
interconnections may require additional attention and end-to-end testing prior to SoS-
wide employment, which can often be complex, time-consuming, and expensive to
conduct. JMTIRA has the capability to identify potential system weaknesses, such as
network bottlenecks, bandwidth limitations, protocol conflicts, and single points of
failure. By identifying high-risk areas prior to joint task force formation, CII efforts can
be focused on these areas to mitigate potential problems. Even if highlighted conflict
areas cannot be resolved, this knowledge is still vitally important to the warfighter as part
of Courses of Action and force protection development.
JMTIRA will typically consider three primary risk factors: System Inheritance,
Interface Testability, and Criticality. System Inheritance is the risk associated with the
inherent engineering characteristics of a system. Interface Testability is the risk
associated with being able to effectively test the system in a controlled integration
environment, and Criticality is the mission-based consequence to the JTF if the system
does fail.
3. Summary
JMTIRA is still more theory than tool in its current state. However, its underlying
Y2K testing methodology has shown promise in being adapted to evaluating
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interoperability. To be useful in this regard, JMTIRA will need to develop the following
capabilities:
• System /sub-system reliability/maintainability statistics.
• E-to-E system testing results and performance metrics.
• E-to-E system interface interactions.
• System-function mission relationships.
Ideally, the JMTIRA risk factor rating capability would be incorporated into a JCAPS or
MSTAR -like tool to provide a complementary (and currently unavailable) functionality.
4. Other Available Tools
a) InterPro
InterPro is an interoperability tool developed especially for the Joint
Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization (JTAMDO). It is a SIPRNET tool
designed to analyze requirements necessary for inter-system/inter-service compatibility
and interoperability within the Ballistic Missile Defense CRD. It has the ability to
retrieve detailed data on Service-centric C4I systems but is limited in the same way other
tools are by the limited amount of data currently available. It supports Information
Exchange Requirement (IER) analysis and provides some automated interoperability
analysis functionality. InterPro can create or modify C4I architectures in real-time
through an specially designed update interface. Joint testing, exercise assessments, and
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combined C4I theater interfaces are being incorporated into its repository at the JITC.
InterPro was not assessed in this thesis due to its classified nature.37
b) JIT
The Joint Interoperability Tool (JIT) is available through the JITC web
site. The JIT is basically a large search and retrieval document-based repository for
interoperability related information. A search function allows users (primarily PMs) to
research a variety of interoperability topics. JIT features include:
• NATO Interface Guide-allows users to seek guidance on configuring systems to
be compatible with NATO countries.
• DoD Interoperability Communications Exercise - gives the user detailed reports
and test reports on specific exercises.
• Lessons Learned Reports - provides the user relevant information regarding
interoperability lessons learned.
• Certification Summaries - Provides the user completing listing of JITC
certifications since FY96.
• Interoperability Test Reports - provides the user JITC Interoperability test reports
on selected systems.
• References - the user can view and download instructions and directives related to
interoperability.
5. Summary
We have reviewed what we believe to be the most promising tools for
constructing assessing and analyzing joint interoperability tools. There may be other
37 http://iitc.fhu.disa.mil
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methodologies and tools being used by agencies inside and outside DoD that we are
unaware of. What we are certain of is that the tools we have discussed have some of the
capabilities required to address C4ISR systems interoperability. In the next chapter we
present a more thorough discussion of the capabilities and limitations of these tools.
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V. ASSESSMENT OF THE INTEROPERABILITY TOOLS
I see you've constructed a new light saber. Your skills are
complete. Indeed you are as powerful as the Emperor has
foreseen.
Darth Vader
Star Wars Episode VI
A. INTRODUCTION
Despite some of the rhetoric, interoperability among DoD C4ISR systems is not
an unreachable goal. Chapters II and III introduced the ambiguity that exists in DoD's
policy towards interoperability, but the PM developing C4ISR systems can achieve
interoperable system and technical architectures despite the political and bureaucratic
jungle before him. A methodology to assist in accomplishing this at the PM level is
being developed at the Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORYSCOM). The goal
is to baseline the Marine Corps' "go-to-war" architectures.
Using assessment tools, system metrics, and past test results MARCORSYSCOM
wants to be able to give Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Commanders
confidence in their C4ISR systems by developing and accrediting operational C4I
architectures. In this chapter we discuss how the C4ISR Directorate of
MARCORSYSCOM can effectively approach interoperability. This involves a "hands-
on" assessment of MSTAR. We look at an architecture constructed in MSTAR called a
MAGTF Integrated Package (MIP) and assess the interoperability of this architecture
using the LISI Inspector Tool that is integrated with MSTAR. By way of comparison, we
look at the same MIP using the JCAPS tool. By conducting this type of side-by-side
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assessment we can ascertain the capabilities of two automated tools designed to help PMs
field interoperable systems within the C4ISR Architectural Framework and in keeping
with the requirements of DII COE.
B. MAGTF C4ISR INTEGRATED PACKAGE
1. Introduction
MIPs are the baseline for near-term and future technical architectures. The MIP
depicts the entire technical architecture of a MAGTF. The MIP technical architecture
depicts all C4I systems in the Marine Corps inventory and systems that will be introduced
into the inventory through the acquisition cycle. Elements in the MAGTF can depicted
down to the individual squad level. These depictions represent the Ground Combat
Element (GCE), Air Combat Element (ACE) and Combat Service Support Element
(CSSE) of the MAGTF. The MIP is an evolutionary product; MARCORYSCOM has
designated six MIP levels, each level representing an increase in capability and
interoperability. MARCORSYSCOM is currently developing MIP-0, defined as the
minimum baseline architecture representing the MAGTF' s current C4I systems
connectivity. MIPs 1-4 represent progressively more integrated and capable levels to be
introduced annually, leading to MIP-5 in FY-05 that represents the fully functional
interoperability defined in DII COE.
84
2. The MIP Levels
a) MIP-0
This level is the current baseline architecture that exists in the Fleet
Marine Force today. MIP-0 consists of all C4ISR systems currently in the inventory. As
of July 00, the MSTAR data repository had architectures for all GCE systems, 60% of
CSSE systems, and about 10% of ACE systems. All C4ISR systems had been entered
into the database but graphical architecture depictions for the ACE and CSSE elements
are not yet fully completed. MIP-0 is a baseline that assumes an environment of limited
interoperability because of legacy systems, protocol conflicts, and service-related
standards and doctrinal disparities.
b) MIP-1
MIP-1 is the first evolutionary step towards a globally interoperable
MAGTF C4ISR environment. It incorporates limited interoperability with US Army
systems, includes smaller, more capable hardware/software platforms, and satellite
communication integration.
c) MIP-2
MIP-2 begins the movement towards the DII COE's Common Tactical
Picture (CTP). Goals of MIP-2 include advanced communication technologies, reduced
training requirements, and fusion of maneuver, intelligence and fire support systems.
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d) MIPS
MIP-3 encompasses the fully integrated GCE Unit Operations Center
concept that includes wireless LAN technologies as well as a data gateway that integrates
the CTP into lower-level C4I systems.
e) MIP-4
MIP-4 encompasses a homogenous software suite residing on a scaleable
hardware framework. This architecture would exhibit self-healing and self-organizing
capability in its networks, integration of fully functional CSSE logistics capability, and a
fused air/ground Common Operational Picture.
f) MIPS
MIP-5 is the goal of interoperability; completely DII COE compliant,
utilizing enhanced technologies such as the Joint Tactical Radio System and Global
Information Grid.
3. Developing a MIP
There are two evolutions in MIP development. The first is the MIP specification.
Specification is what we want the MIP to be above and beyond the previous MIP level.
The second evolution is MIP design. MIP design takes into account the all the changes




The MIP specification starts by examining the following requirements
groups: User, System, Function, and Security. These requirements are based on various
documents; for example, user requirements come from ORDs, functional requirements
from CRDs, etc. Security requirements may have been incorporated into the ORD but
can also come from DoD or Executive Policy. System requirements are technical
specifications and standards required by DII COE, JTA, or other Marine Corps/DoD
standards. The requirements are grouped into sets using the MIP baseline and acquisition
programmatic information. Any dependencies among the requirement sets can also be
examined at this point.
All requirement sets are prioritized based on guidance from the
Management Configuration Control Board (MCCB) and the priorities of the Operating
Forces. Metrics are used to prioritize the requirement sets, to include the number of
capability sets completed, number of capability sets improved, number of operational
facilities (OPFACs) impacted, number of systems impacted, degree to which automation/
simplicity is improved, and which requirement sets best fulfill key performance
parameters (KPPs).
The requirement sets are configured with cost and schedule data to the
greatest extent possible. Decisions are now made as to which requirement sets seem most
promising. It is at this point that programmatic modeling and simulation tools can be
effectively used. Once the finalized requirement sets are decided upon they form the
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basis of the MIP specification. The system specification consists of the agreed upon
requirement sets, system KPPs, standards requirements, systems impacted, and a set of
constraints composed of cost, schedule, and performance requirements.
b) MIP Design
The MIP design transforms the MIP specification into a usable document,
articulated into operational, system, and technical design architectures. The design
process starts by integrating the MIP specification with any new guidance received since
the completion of the specification along with Marine Corps/Joint-level policy, issues,
and standards. Once changes have been incorporated into the specification the initial
design can be constructed. This design consists of four major elements: architectural,
hardware, software and standards. The architectural may be a graphical or text depiction
of the three architectural views. The hardware design will include elements such as
physical connectivity between systems (wire/wireless), the systems themselves (radio,
switch, workstation), and other hardware-related concerns to address middleware issues.
The software design will specify what software will be implemented from database to
office suites, and will reach back to address middleware issues as well. The standards
design will be one of the most politically sensitive and difficult design areas to resolve
because it affects all other designs.
After the initial design options have been broken out, interoperability
assessments are conducted to identify and resolve interoperability issues. Once these
issues are resolved through refinement, the four designs are integrated into a single
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master design. The master design is mapped to the programmatic issues of cost, schedule
and performance and a realistic design implementation plan is attached to the final MIP
design.
Personnel from Marine Corps Systems Command and MCCDC Concepts
Division work together in developing the MIP specification and design. Other agencies
that will have involvement during this process are:
• AC/S C4I, Headquarters Marine Corps (Policy)
• Programs and Resources, Headquarters Marine Corps (Funding)
• Material Command, Marine Corps Base, Albany, GA. (Logistics & Fielding)
• Defense Information Systems Agency (DII COE, DISN, GCCS)
• Joint Interoperability Test Center, (Interoperability Testing & Certification)
These agencies will play an even more important role as the MIP design is
routed through the approval process. Missing from this list is perhaps the most important
participant: the user. It is unrealistic to assume that the operating forces can afford to
designate a full-time representative to the MIP design process despite the critical role
they have in its implementation. While MCCDC Concepts Division is the designated
representative of the user (by policy), issues that they table on the users behalf may be




The MIP Approval process begins with MCCB approving the proposed
MIP specification. Once the MIP specification is approved, work on the MIP design can
begin. The MIP design is then finalized as discussed earlier, and re-submitted to the
MCCB for approval. If approval is given, development of the MIP can begin, otherwise
the MIP design is recycled for refinement based on the input of the MCCB.
MARCORSYSCOM is responsible for developing a test plan for the MIP
design. One of the factors to be considered in developing this plan is the capability of the
candidate test facilities. Questions that should be asked are:
• Does the facility have physical capability to assess interoperability and function?
• Does the facility have simulation tools to assess interoperability and function?
• Can the facility verify that all KPPs are met?
• Can the facility verify IERs and identify the need for new IERs between
OPFACs?
• Can the OPFACs be physically constructed or simulated?
• Can the facility test using the prescribed metrics in the test plan?
The PM must also consider what KPPs, IERs, and other measures of
effectiveness are testable and affordable. The PM must ensure that data collection
measures are in place and what type of format the report will use. The MIP design will
be configured for testing and submitted to either the Marine Corps Tactical Systems
Support Activity (MCTSSA) in Camp Pendleton, CA or the Joint Interoperability Test
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Center (JITC) in Ft. Huachuca, AZ. The function of these organizations is to provide test
and evaluation (T&E) of C4I systems in a controlled environment. MCTSSA and/or
JITC can perform a wide range ofT&E tasks. These include:
• Verification of functions
• Validation of Concepts of Employment
• Risk Reduction Efforts through design, performance and interoperability
assessments
• Enable Rapid Replication of trouble calls.
• Assess before/after fielding of system modifications
• Facilitate User assessment and acceptability
• Assess systems for proper implementation of standards, protocols and interfaces.
Reviews of test results will determine what fixes to the MIP design are
required. Not all fixes may be pursued; it will all come down to what is feasible under
cost, schedule, and performance considerations. Once the PM is satisfied with the tested
MIP a fielding decision can be made. MARCORSYSCOM is not certain whether the
MIP design will be subjected to the normal acquisition process or if a tailored acquisition
approach will be pursued.
d) The ApprovedMIP
It is important to keep in mind that the MIP is an acquisition program. It
is a product that will be delivered for real-world use by the Marine Corps. What makes
the MIP unique is that this may be the first time a Service has tried to deliver its entire
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"go-to-war" architecture as a configured, tested, and integrated product. One thing is for
certain, it will represent the first time the Marine Corps has attempted to integrate its
4ISR architecture.
The fielded notional MAGTF Integrated C4I Package is designed to be a
viable "go-to-war" architecture incorporating all three operational, system, and technical
views. It integrates all elements of the MAGTF, giving a C4I system of systems capable
of exchange with land, air, and sea -based platforms. In the near-term, it gives an usable
capability to Marine Expeditionary Forces and ultimately delivers a blueprint for the
accomplishment of DII COE compliance and the achievement of Joint Vision 2020 goals.
In reality, the MIP faces many challenges. Fiscal, doctrinal, and political
barriers will conspire to impede the development of the MIP. The MIP will also require
a thorough understanding of C4ISR Architecture Framework Version 2.0 and must be
delivered as a functional product to its users despite the shortcomings of C4ISR
Architecture Framework. Most importantly, the MIP must be a product that is embraced
by the warfighter. This is perhaps the most difficult task of all. The user is always
skeptical of systems in "fancy" packaging. If requirements are not articulated, captured,
and developed properly in regards to interoperability the user will be left with much of
what he has always had in the past: more fancy packaging.
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C. DEVELOPING A MIP WITH MSTAR
1. Introduction
In this section we present an imaginary scenario where two clients are
designing/refining a MIP using the features of the MSTAR tool. The first client user is
the C4I Directorate of MARCORSYSCOM (PM Client), and the other is a Marine
Expeditionary Brigade G-6 (MEB Client). In the first illustration, the PM will be using
the MSTAR tool as the MIP design process is progressing through the programmatic
cycle. In the second, the MEB will have just completed a joint exercise and based on
issues in the C4I debriefings wishes to make refinements to a previously defined MIP
architecture. These user-based perspectives will be utilized in order to discuss the
benefits and shortcomings of the MSTAR tool, and to suggest how it might be improved.
2. Access and Security
All versions of MSTAR will be accessed via a standard web browser. The PM
client will access MSTAR through the NIPRNET, the MEB client through the SIPRNET.
MARCORSYSCOM wants to control access to MSTAR due to security, document
classification, and input validation concerns. Having both classified and unclassified
versions of MSTAR will complicate MARCORSYSCOM's management challenge. The
necessity of the unclassified version is for the contractors who do not have SIPRNET
access, but any information, especially of a technical nature, would be useless to
contractors in a unclassified version. The same could be said for the MEB client wanting
to make comments. Any comments they make to MSTAR, especially from an
operational theater, would have to be considered as classified. One SIPRNET version of
93
MSTAR with compartmentalized access would make the most sense. Any contractor
requiring access should already be pre-qualified, and SIPRNET-only access helps the
operational forces control input to MSTAR. Of greater concern to MCCDC and
MARCORYSCOM is the possibility of users (primarily operational forces) submitting
issues over NIPRNET when they should be classified. Even on SIPRNET, there is
concern that compartmentalized issues can still be submitted within the wrong
classification (i.e. top-secret issues going over a secret server). To summarize, what
MSTAR ultimately needs is a true object-level security model, a capability beyond the
current NT implementation.
3. System/Item Reports
The System/Item Reports options can be accessed by the user via the MSTAR
home page. Both the MEB client and PM client have access to the information in these
reports. For the MEB client the technical data in these reports is somewhat limited. A
description of the selected system and its function is available, but in most cases technical
specifications such as power, bandwidth, and protocols are missing. It is hard to
envision the MEB client wanting only general information on a specific system. Some
programmatic information is available such as acquisition objectives, but the MEB client
would benefit from more specific information on system procurement programmatics,
such as an actual fielding plan giving a more specific data as to when they could expect
new systems. For the PM Client, little of the information in the System/Item reports
seems to be of value. Fortunately for both PM and MEB Clients, MSTAR will
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eventually tie into the MARCORSYSCOM Command Acquisition Program System
(CAPS). CAPS provides specific programmatic information, including fielding plans,
technical characteristics, acquisition data, and PM/Sponsor PoCs. However, as of this
writing, very little of this information was available in CAPS and most of it was outdated.
For the System/Item reports to be truly useful to the PM and MEB clients, system
information in these reports must have a greater degree of granularity. Given adequate
oversight, this problem should resolve as both the MSTAR repository and CAPS
databases mature.
4. The Architecture Depictions
The Architecture Depictions feature of the MSTAR tool is what makes the tool
unique and beneficial to PM and MEB Clients; unfortunately it is also the feature with the
most shortcomings. Architecture Depictions are graphical illustrations of the MAGTF
system and technical architectures. This depiction shows the connectivity of various
systems to their respective network clouds. Clicking any of the systems in the depiction
retrieves System/Item reports. Clicking network clouds retrieves the network's internal
architecture, depicting all systems in the cloud and identifying all subscribers connected
to it. These depictions loosely fit the definitions for system and technical architectural
views as outlined in the C4ISR Architecture Framework depictions in MSTAR, listed by
organizational name or OPFAC. MSTAR' s ability to drill-down into the architectural
depictions defines the OPFACs into finer levels of detail.
95
OPFACs listed in these reports do not provide any IERs nor does it label
Information Elements, whereas the C4ISR Architecture Framework labels connectivity
redundant between two OPFACs if they do not have an IER. While connectivity based
on widely accepted standards is a vital component in this since all OPFACs on a network
are connected via TCP/IP, it would seem obvious that messages should always get where
they are going without the necessity for explicitly identifying needlines or IERs between
OPFACs. Only Application-level interoperability can be solved with this sort of
"hammer & nails" methodologies such as XML, SNMP, SOAP and
CORBA/COM/DCOM (assuming the entire system of systems has IP connectivity).
More tangible concerns focus on having the dollars to build out the remaining nodes to
become IP compliant and other IP-specific issues such as firewalls, varying levels of
classified traffic, and Voice IP latency.
Without IERs, planners and ultimately CINCs cannot designate their most
important OPFACs and the exchanges required between them at varying operational
tempos. OPFACs will certainly have differing bandwidth requirements than others.
Some OPFACs may be more important than others based on the information they
disseminate or may have to be shutdown temporarily during high operational tempos.
OPFACs, if lost, may affect the rest of the network because of their nature as a critical
processing node.
IERs help establish what parts of the networks are the keys to a Commander's risk
assessment of his network. If a MEB CO. wants to know if an AV-8B aircraft can talk to
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a Light Armored Vehicle, he could not find specific depictions in MSTAR without
knowing what systems are inherent to these platforms, as static depictions of these
operational scenarios are not available. This makes for difficult planning, briefs, and hot
washes where higher architectural views are typically utilized. It may also be necessary
to diagnose why two systems that should interoperate are not. Again, without the ability
to display a IER matrix such relationships cannot be shown with MSTAR.
For the PM Client this type of operational view may not be of great concern.
However, the PM Client is presented with his own set of challenges. First of all, the
Aperture tool inherent in the Oracle database cannot be used through a standard web
browser. This drawing tool can only be used by MSTAR developers at C4ISR
Directorate, MARCORSYSCOM or Concepts Directorate, MCCDC. Changes to
architectural constructs must be manually routed to Oracle-trained Logicon programmers.
The requirement to "what-if ' scenarios is common in the acquisition arena and would be
expensive and time consuming in its current state. This same limitation also affects the
MEB Client in a similar manner, where it would be of great benefit for a battle staff to
construct dynamically changing architectural depictions in a collaborative environment.
5. LISI Inspector Tool
The interoperability profile link will connect both the PM and MEB Clients to one
of MSTAR' s most valuable features, the LISI Inspector Tool. LISI Inspector is
embedded into MSTAR and is capable of drawing data from the MSTAR repository as
well as other repositories linked to LISI Inspector. It is important to distinguish that LISI
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is a model and the LISI Inspector is simply an automated tool that uses the LISI model.
Inspector is essentially an interoperability questionnaire designed to obtain information
on a specific system, store this information in a database, and provide advanced reporting
functionality based on this data. The questionnaire presents structured questions that list
the available choices for each capability/service that can be implemented in an
information system. The data generated from the questionnaire is then used to build
system interoperability profiles from both a systems maturity perspective and a pair-wise
comparison perspective. The questionnaire is comprehensive, consisting of 256
questions on the characteristics of the system in question. The LISI Inspector tool is
designed to generate many of the interoperability assessment products directly from the
questionnaire. Both the MEB and PM Clients have full access to LISI capabilities;
however, updating information on a system through LISI Inspector is restricted to
password authenticated authorized users.
6. C4ISR Technical Issues Forum
This feature (yet to be implemented) will allow the PM and MEB clients to view,
edit, or add comments on various C4ISR systems in the Marine Corps and DOD. The
feature is fairly user friendly but all entries are limited to text. The tool currently allows
searching the repository for specific issues by function, topic, keyword, or system. The
C4ISR Technical Issues feature has its own database, so Client's unrestricted write ability
does not affect the MSTAR Architecture Depictions or the System/Item Reports.
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For both the PM and MEB clients the ability to enter information in formats
besides text would be of benefit. Technical data, schematics, depictions, presentations
and even pictures should all be formats that should be accepted by the MSTAR system.
Because this forum does not affect the MSTAR baseline data, this could be one of the
avenues to incorporate drawing capabilities and in time this could become the most
useful feature of MSTAR. By utilizing the available Oracle client collaboration tools this
could also become an engaging forum for operational planners and program developers.
7. Summary
MSTAR is not yet ready for "prime time". Significant work remains in
populating the database and more detailed technical information is required in the
System/Item reports. The ACE and CSSE elements will still need to be completed in the
MSTAR architectural depictions. The tool does not really present an operational view as
defined in the C4ISR Architecture Framework. The most serious shortcoming is the
inability for a client to modify architectural depictions or technical information directly.
This deficiency inhibits operational planning and "what-if ' scenario construction. The
MEB client cannot realistically make design changes to a MIP. His only avenue is to
make suggestions in text format, limited to 4000 characters. The PM Client, despite
being the keeper of some of the systems in the architecture, has the same limitations. The
C4I Directorate, who is the "owner" of the MSTAR database, can use Logicon
contractors to build/revise architecture depictions or System/Item information, but other
PMs who have system specific data to update do not have direct access (providing an
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unnecessary level of frustration in a command as contentious as MARCORSYSCOM).
The inability of the PM and MEB Client users to make MSTAR inputs without
immediate MSTAR feedback will ultimately adversely affect user acceptance. This is
unfortunate because the need for a central repository for MAGTF architectures is vital to
the overall interoperability effort, but the users must be allowed to affect the process if
the architectures are to be credible.
D. DEVELOPING A MIP WITH JCAPS
1. Introduction
Like MSTAR, JCAPS 's primary function is the development and presentation of
architectures within the guidelines of the DoD C4ISR Architectural Framework. Perhaps
the most glaring difference between the two is that the JCAPS program has the backing
of OSD while MSTAR is supported solely from within the austere fiscal environment of
the Marine Corps. JCAPS Version 2.1 is being evaluated by all theater CINCs and major
Unified Commands, while MSTAR is still relatively unknown even in
MARCOESYSCOM. JCAPS is still client-server based (unlike MSTAR' s web-based
implementation) but it can function much more effectively in a collaborative
environment, where clients will be able to interactively create and revise architectural
depictions. JCAPS does not have an interoperability assessment tool per se but plans to
interface with the LISI Inspector tool (much like MSTAR) in future versions.
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2. Access & Security
JCAPS must be run over a secure LAN in client-server mode. Eventually JCAPS
will be a web-based enterprise server with access via standard web browsers. MEB
clients accessing via the Web will be able to create and modify some of the systems data
contained within the JCAPS database, while the PM Client will have easier access to
JCAPS initially. In either case, access is controlled currently through the OSD JCAPS
program office and distributed individually to commands for installation. Once the web-
enabled JCAPS enterprise server/database becomes available users will still need client
software to run the various drawing tools and features. The "owner" of the JCAPS
enterprise server/database (yet to be determined) will administer security.
3. Tools Cabinet
The first feature clients will want to use is the Tools Cabinet. This allows the
client access to the fundamental building blocks of JCAPS operations. These Elements
will allow the PM and MEB Client to create/revise their MIP depictions. Elements are
populated by two different sets of data: world and architecture. World data elements are
not associated with a specific architecture already designated in the JCAPS repository,
while architecture data are associated with a specific architecture. Either of these sets of
elements can be manipulated with the tools cabinet.38
The C4ISR Core Architecture Data Model (CADM) defines the Organization
element in the tools cabinet. Organizations in JCAPS can encompass everything from
38 JCAPS Hands-On Training Guide (Prototype 2.1) 1 Mar 2000
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military organizations and OPFACs all the way up to national governments. In a broad
sense, an organization is an operational element, and thus can have Information Exchange
Requirements (IERs), or Activities relating to other organizations, but in JCAPS this is
reserved exclusively for entities designated as OPFACs. The OPFAC is defined as a
specialized Node within JCAPS. Generally, OPFACs are envisioned to be subordinate to
organizations. An OPFAC belongs to an echelon of command and performs activities
within a particular mission. An OPFAC is an operational element and thus can have
IERs or activities relating to other OPFACs.
The Activities Element is associated with OPFACs. The CADM defines an
activity as an operation in a process that is designed to accomplish a specific task or set of
tasks, while a mission is defined as the task, when together with the purpose, that clearly
indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. An activity can originate from
the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), an Activity Model, or a user-defined task that
supports the mission. In JCAPS, an activity simply describes a process that occurs
between two OPFACs, and OPFACs can have multiple activities.
Another feature in JCAPS is known as User Definable Properties. This feature
allows a user to "create" new data fields for each element type and then associate a
property or name to this new data field. This feature can be used as part of a user defined
query. The Tools tab creates User Definable Properties for each element in JCAPS. We
found JCAPS to be lacking in Marine Corps specific systems, but with this feature both
clients can create and populate systems and in turn, further enhance the JCAPS database.
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4. Creating A New Architecture
Creating a new architecture is a two-part process, which includes identifying the
new architecture to the JCAPS program (i.e. giving it a unique name) and developing
individual products to support it. Currently prototype JCAPS Version 2.1 supports the
six C4ISR Architecture Framework products listed below:
Product Reference Architecture Product
Operational Products
OV-1 High-level Operational Concept Graphic
OV-2 Operational Node Connectivity Description
OV-3 Operational Information Exchange Matrix
OV-4 Command Relationship Chart
Systems Products
SV-1 Systems Interface Description
SV-2 Systems Communications Description
Figure 5-1, Framework Products Supported by JCAPS.39
The High-level Operational Concept Graphic gives an overarching perspective of
the operational scenario. It represents the operational components within the mission
landscape and can be used as a means of orienting and focusing detailed decision making,
39 JCAPS Hands-On Training Guide (Prototype 2.1) 1 Mar 2000
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serving as a visual sketchpad for the operational scenario. For MEB Client this is a key
feature that MSTAR does not have.
The Command Relationship Chart is a graphical depiction of the hierarchical
relationships between operational elements. This is similar to the organizational
constructs in MSTAR. Lines of command and control can be drawn among the
operational elements. For example, it would be easy using the tool to depict the
command relationships for a MEB. The decision making structure of activities between
the operational elements can be drawn by designating elements as parents, children, or
siblings.
The Operational Node Connectivity Description is a graphical representation of
the specific relationship between two or more operational elements. This relationship
would be two OPFACs exchanging information elements. The sum of these is an IER and
is represented as a needline between two OPFACs.
The Operational Information Exchange Matrix describes the same information has
the ONCD only in a tabular rather than graphic form. Similar to a spreadsheet, the
columnar headings would have the Information Element, Activity, OPFAC, and
Organization. The total number of IERs could easily be computed from this format. This
feature is what gives significance to JCAPS operational architectures. More importantly,
drawing architectural views in JCAPS is system controlled through this function. For
example, if MEB client wishes to draw connectivity between two OPFACs he must have
an IER between the two to do it. If he attempts to connect them with a user-defined
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needline without an associated IER the program will not allow him to connect them. This
type of control ensures that the operational architecture depictions in OV-1 and OV-2
remain valid. This type of functionality is what is missing in MSTAR.
The System Interface Description represents the communication pathways
between systems, nodes, and components of a system. A detailed description of the
communication pathway or network can be retrieved from the Systems Communications
Description, giving specific information of a network pathway or communication link
such as bandwidth, data rate, channels, and frequency.
5. Summary
JCAPS is a significantly better C4I architecture construct tool than MSTAR. It
allows clients to quickly design "what-if ' scenarios in a collaborative environment. As
JCAPS matures, all technical views of C4ISR Architecture Framework will be available
and JCAPS will be able to show higher degrees of granularity. For example, needlines
can be constructed as network connectivity "pipes" indicating bandwidth characteristics,
number of subscribers, and what resources can be shared, all characteristics of IP
networking.
Unlike MSTAR, JCAPS has all ready undergone a "live-fire" assessment. The
Joint Forces Program Office (JFPO) conducted an assessment of JCAPS by capturing and
documenting an architecture describing the US Alaskan Command. Based on their
assessment, JCAPS is poised to transition from a prototype to an operational system, with
the following caveats: SIPRNET accreditation needs to be expedited (done); Network
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element support/NETWARS data interchange is critical; and the program office should
focus on solidifying existing views vice the addition of new views. The ALCOM effort
required the identification and entry of over 2200 unique elements and nearly 60 products
were generated to visualize the architecture. As a result of the exercise approximately 75
problem areas were observed (note that this is the point in the process where the JMTIRA
risk assessment tool could assess the associated risk level).40
E. THE LISI INSPECTOR INTEROPERABILITY ASSESSMENT OF THE
MIP
1. Introduction
The LISI Inspector tool is embedded into MSTAR and can draw from the
MSTAR repository. The Inspector is also available over the Internet through the CinC
Interoperability Program Office (CIPO) at SPAWAR, San Diego. Both the MSTAR
repository and the LISI repository at SPAWAR contain the same data for Marine Corps
C4I systems. Unfortunately, neither database contained enough data for a thorough
evaluation of our notionally constructed MIP. Neither the MSTAR nor JCAPS tool
allowed us to completely construct a MIP. Most of the data available in the repository
was on systems either recently or yet to be fielded. Legacy systems for the most part
simply did not have data populating the repository, owing to the fact that no
organizational entity has yet been singly tasked with this responsibility. Some items were
not even listed in the database. Of concern here is that our notional architecture was of
40Mitre, Corp. "Analysis ofJCAPS Live Fire Results" Joint Forces Program Office, 20 Dec 99.
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perhaps the simplest of units (an infantry battalion) with a very low C4I sophistication
level, and could still not perform a full LISI Interoperability assessment with the tool due
primarily to lack of data. This indicates that a significant area of emphasis will be simple
data capture/entry if LISI is to be a viable assessment tool for use at the Joint Command
level.
2. LISI Products
Before we discuss the specific LISI products that will be produced in this
assessment, let's review the Generic, Specific, and Expected levels of interoperability and
what they mean. The Generic level is the value of comparing a single system against the
LISI Capabilities Model. For example, if a Marine DACT terminal is at Level G4a, only
the DACT terminal was assessed against the Capabilities Model. The Expected level is
assessed for a pair of systems and is the value assigned against the Capabilities Model but
without an implementation-by-implementation comparison between the two systems. For
example, comparing DACT (G4a) against AFATDS at Glc it is expected that the two
systems will be able to perform interactions characterized by Elc. The Specific level is
the value assigned against the Capabilities Model between two systems when specific
implementation choices are made. The Specific level may be different than the expected
level based on the added use of the LISI Options Tables and the consideration of
technical implementation choices. The Specific level for a DACTS/AFATDS
comparison may be lower than Elc if the implementation choices made to facilitate a
particular capability are not compatible. This is often the case when two systems have
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different security constraints. The Specific level for a DACTS/AFATDS comparison can
also be higher than Elc if there is an extended interface between the two systems that
allows them to interoperate at a level higher than expected. This can be the case with the
introduction of software to two systems not documented in the LISI database.41
3. LISI Products and MIP Interoperability Results
The LISI Inspector Questionnaire forms the bridge between the LISI Models and
the LISI products. PM and MEB Clients will select choices in the questionnaire that will
allow LISI Inspector to generate four primary sets of assessment products. The four
assessment products are:
• Interoperability Profiles
• Interoperability Assessment Matrices
• Interoperability Comparison Tables
• Interoperability System Interface Description
a) Interoperability Profiles
Interoperability Profiles map LISI Questionnaire data to the LISI
Capabilities Model template. In this case we evaluated the MIP systems available in the
LISI database and it generated generic Interoperability Profiles for each system. In many
instances a GOo ("undefined") was assigned for the MIP systems. For this demonstration
we assumed that if the system was listed in the database, then data was available for an
41 Levels of Information System Interoperability Report, C4ISR Architecture Working Group, Department
of Defense, 30 March 1998.
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assessment. Appendix 1 gives the Generic interoperability profiles of the systems in our
notional MIP that appeared in the LI SI database.
b) Interoperability Assessment Matrices
aaaa? casual ca? LJSI Projected Interoperability Assessment Matrix
reclassified
Systems .-•to-
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Figure 5-2, Interoperability Assessment Matrix
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These products interrelated groups of systems based on their Generic.
Expected, and Specific interoperability levels. The results are presented in a matrix
format that enables each system pair to be compared. This format makes this product
useful to both types of clients in systems development, acquisition, and operational
planning. In our assessment we used the projected Interoperability Assessment Matrix.
This matrix can be generated for a group of systems based on the Generic interoperability
level of each system and the Specific interoperability level for each system pair within the
group.














Figure 5-3, Interoperability Requirements Matrix.
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These products present the results of system-to-system PAID
implementation assessment. These products provide a comparison of interoperability
implementation information between systems in terms of PAID. The product we used
was the Interconnection Requirements Table. A major factor that drives interoperability
relationships and requirements is agreement among organizations and PMs on the need of
particular systems to share inputs and outputs with one another. This table takes the LISI
questionnaire data that specifies what systems should talk to each other and then lists
them as input and outputs with one another. The I/Os are color-coded: green for an
agreed upon exchange; red if the exchange is not agreed upon; yellow for a partial
agreement; and gray for requirements not expressed by either system. For example, the
DACT has an agreed upon information exchange with AFATDS and GCCS but not with
IAS, based on information provided by the PMs and entered into the LISI database for
each system.
d) Interoperability System Interface Description
As seen previously the C4ISR Architecture Framework defines standard
products to describe the operational, systems and technical views and the relationships
between them. Information from LISI can be incorporated into many of these products to
quantify the interoperability aspects of C4I architectures. Basic information from System
Interoperability Profiles can be directly applied to architecture products. For example,
LISI can depict the node connectivity of our notional MIP and the interoperability levels
it is functioning at between systems. The MEB client may wish to drill down to the
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interoperability level between the infantry battalion and another rifle company. As long
as the MEB client knows what systems the battalion and company are using and they are
in the LISI database, LISI will give a nodal view of the connectivity between the two.
4. The Future of Interoperability Tools
As would be expected, PMs for JCAPS, MSTAR, LISI and JMTIRA all have
future development plans for their respective tools. Unfortunately, none of these
programs receives much budgetary consideration. While JV2020 explicitly names
interoperability as a critical issue, funding decisions continue to not reflect this.
a) JCAPS Future Development
Based upon ongoing DoD evaluation, JCAPS will incorporate user
recommendations into a new version currently under development that will include a
transition to an three-tiered web-based enterprise approach. JCAPS will also integrate
decision support and knowledge management functions (known as the Joint Mission Area
Analysis Tool) into its database to further enhance C4I and C2 planning at the operational
level. JCAPS 2.1.1 features an interface to other service C4I data repositories, to include
the LISI Inspector Tool and LISI Database; however, there is no functionality planned to
allow reverse access by outside systems. Lastly, acquisition program information and
expansion of its capabilities to more fully support logistics and administration structures
are also being planned for JCAPS.
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b) MSTAR Future Development
MSTAR plans to develop a more robust operational view depiction that
would include the ability to extract General Officer -level presentation capability. It will
also extend its integration of acquisition program information to include configuration
management tools, work breakdown structures, integrated process team presentations,
and requirements documents parsing/categorization. It is clear from these planned efforts
that MSTAR will remain primarily a tool for program developers and managers at
MARCORSYSCOM.
c) LISI Future Development
LISI and its Inspector Tool are perhaps the most mature of the tools we
evaluated. LISI will continue to populate its database and extend integration with other
C4I technical databases both in DoD and the commercial sector. LISI will also be adding
another level, coined "Unified", to its five layer Capabilities Maturity Model. Inspector
will also continue to develop its profile questionnaires to provide even a greater degree of
granularity in its report capability. Most importantly, as technology evolves the LISI
model is perhaps the most flexible and easily adaptable, and for these reasons may very
well remain the most central and relevant of the tools.
d) JMTIRA
JMTIRA is the least evolved of the products we have evaluated, remaining
more methodology than tool. JMTIRA will improve the integration of its database to
advanced statistical algorithms as well as converting its database structure to C4I system
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and technical data to support interoperability vice Y2K risk assessment. JMTIRA will
eventually also be incorporated by modeling and simulation efforts such as the Network
Warfare Simulation (NETWARS) and the Joint Modeling and Simulation System
F. SUMMARY
The interoperability and integration tools we assessed show considerable promise.
PMs and operational planners can take comfort in knowing that automated tools are on
their way. All the tools assessed require more development, but integration among the
tools is even more critical. Our MIP cannot currently be constructed with the tools in
their current state. Given a degree of integration between all the tools examined, a good
cup of coffee and a computer with a goodly amount of RAM, we could have constructed
our Infantry Battalion MIP in a matter of hours. It is critical for DoD to continue
development of these tools. We find it interesting to note that one of the critical factors
in making this "system" of disparate interoperability tools fulfill their collective promise
is their ultimate ability to interoperate amongst themselves.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Architecture is life, or at least it is life itself taking form
and therefore it is the truest record of life as it was lived in
the world yesterday, as it is lived today or ever will be
lived.
Frank Lloyd Wright
A. INTEROPERABILTY: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
1. Compatibility to Interoperability to Integration
Thankfully, interoperability has been receiving increased attention from the
operational community. As forward-looking doctrinal discussions such as Joint Vision
2020 take place, it is becoming apparent that achieving dominance of the "infosphere"
requires much more than just having the most advanced information systems. Returning
to Assistant Secretary of the Navy Buchanan's analogy from Chapter II, we know we
already grow the best vegetables in the world, and we are slowly, painfully learning
which ones taste best with each other. What still remains is to figure out how to put it all
together in a salad that someone will actually be able to eat.
Interoperability success in the past has come as a result of the certification effort
and the emphasis on standardization compliance. We have realized for some time that
the devil of assuring interoperability is in the details of implementation. The problem we
continue to have is that testing and evaluation efforts have been predominately focused
on System-Centric issues. Certification of system-to-system interfaces does not conclude
the integration process; it merely begins it.
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Much of today's efforts in development and testing are necessary to deliver
functioning individual capabilities. Individual system certification and verification will
continue to be required to ensure architectural and standards-based compliance. The
process of determining and defining all the elements that make up the continuously
evolving DII COE is a full-time endeavor. However, what we are beginning to find is
that this effort is only a part of the overall solution. Evaluating individual systems and
testing dual-system interfaces is not the same as examining an entire mission-based
system of systems. Whereas much of the past's emphasis was on compatibility and
today's is on interoperability, the future challenge we must face is integration.
2. Mission-based Testing
Today's interoperability testing component is still almost exclusively technically
oriented, but more importantly, plays its greatest role late in the development effort as the
program nears completion. To take the next step towards the ultimate goal of systems
integration, testing in general must not only be focused on standards compliance and
system acceptance but must also begin to consider the contribution to mission
accomplishment of the individual system within the context of the SoS. Interoperability
needs to be driven "top-down" by considerations of operational significance (vice simply
complying with standards) as well as facilitated "bottom-up" by the C4I acquisitions and
technical communities, beginning much earlier in the development process (i.e. pre-
Milestone 0). Previous attempts in this area have been plagued by a chrome
underestimation of the complexity involved with this type of testing. By focusing on
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system evaluation within a Capstone Requirements Documents (CRD) framework,
greater involvement by testing activities will be needed earlier in the requirements
specification process to be successful.
3. Capstone Requirement Document Integration
While the testing of CRD integration in joint exercises or advanced simulation
environments can support the ability of PMs and doctrinal planners to move forward, it
cannot overcome the shortfalls of bad requirements or poor architectural design. In
today's acquisition lifecycle, the integration phase of a CRD has traditionally followed
the development and testing phases of all the individual systems and interfaces that make
up the SoS. To move from interoperability into a truly integrated environment, these
efforts must begin to occur in parallel. Attempts at integrating a SoS as a prototype for
experimentation can provide significant insights into the consequences of operational
requirements and design decisions made earlier in the acquisition process.42 This
concurrent strategy will render a clearer understanding early in the acquisition cycle vice
near the end, as seen in the more conventional waterfall approach that relies primarily on
knowledge of the capabilities of individual systems for early CRD integration decisions.
42 Krygiel, Annette. Behind the Wizard's Curtain. DoD C4ISR Cooperative Research Program Publication
Series, 1999.
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B. THREE ASPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE
1. Universal Interoperability
The promise of a "plug-n-play" Common Operating Environment is a seductive
one. As a practical matter, large organizations (such as DoD) are generally unable to start
with such a blank slate, so consideration for legacy system inclusion in the DII COE is a
requirement and certain compromises will have to be made. While an architecture that
enables common data structures/interface provisions and high-level specification/
information exchange requirements would be optimal, this "holy grail" could be just that:
an unattainable goal.
The ideal of universal interoperability is neither achievable nor necessary for C4I
systems. It should be obvious even to the most casual observer that not every system on
the battlefield needs to interoperate with every other one. Nor is universal
interoperability technically feasible given the rate of change in both technologies and
missions. The determination of what and how much interoperability is sufficient, as well
as decision-making about allocation of resources, can only be addressed within the
operational context.
As seen earlier, interoperability does not come without a price. The challenge is
to define the minimum number of instances where interoperability is imperative, and to
estimate the incremental value of interoperability beyond this point. Interoperability
between specifically identified systems that need to work together based on the mission
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is more efficient and achievable than building every conceivable system according to a
single high-level architecture.
2. Joint Operational Architecture/Joint Systems Architecture
The future of the interoperability question hinges on the ability of the
requirements generation system and acquisition lifecycle to incorporate the systems and
operational portions of architecture as successfully as they have the technical aspect.
Much effort has gone into the development of the JTA, and the beginnings of a Joint
Operational Architecture (JOA) are now being produced. However, the JTA can only
enable interoperability, not assure it. The JTA and DII COE only address interoperability
problems at the lower layers of the OSI model, and rightly so. Higher layer issues such
as data semantics and applications compatibility are within the developing JOA, while
issues such as modularity and coupling are the purview of the largely unexamined Joint
Systems Architecture (JSA) realm. The importance to be found in this is that it requires
all three parts of architecture to truly achieve integration, and an emphasis on any one
over the other two will not prove to be effective.43 While it has been advantageous to
advance the technical aspect (via the JTA) to facilitate the development of the remaining
two, we cannot assume that only the technical will solve the full spectrum of
interoperability problems.
43 National Research Council. Realizing the Potential ofC4I: Fundamental Challenges. National
Academy of Sciences, 1999.
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C. AN INTEGRATION PROCESS ARCHITECTURE
1. Introduction
We have shown that PMs and operational planners both have tools at their
disposal to aid in achieving interoperable C4I systems and architectures. At this time
these tools remain incoherent and incomplete but do show potential for improvement. As
these tools mature they will enhance DoD C4I interoperability and integration. In the
meantime what is lacking is a coordinated high-level plan of attack on where and how
these tools fit in the development cycle.
As an example, even though the systems are developed by the same contractor,
MSTAR and JCAPS show little consideration for integrating with one another. MSTAR
is still very much a stovepipe system, while JCAPS (which has the endorsement of OSD)
lacks grassroots support amongst the Services. The LISI Inspector is theoretically
promising but its implementation is woefully short of DoD and service specific C4I
system data. LISI also has the disadvantage of being a complex and thus easily
misunderstood model. As an interoperability tool JMTIRA is embryonic in its
development and few people outside SPAWAR Systems Center Charleston are even
aware of it.
Of the four tools discussed, only LISI will be integrated with any of the other
tools, and only JCAPS has a well-defined development strategy. Each tool has its own
unique strengths; however, it is integrated together that these tools hold the most promise.
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D. REQUIREMENTS-TO-CAPABILITIES (R-TO-C) MODEL
1. Introduction
It would be rather hypocritical for the forces of interoperability to suggest that C4I
systems need to be developed jointly when the interoperability assessment tools
themselves are evolving in the same old-fashioned stovepipe manner. What is needed is
an overarching model of where these tools fit in the C4I development process, and then
determine how they can be used synergistically.
In Chapter II we introduced the C4I development cycle as envisioned by CIPO
San Diego. This model, conceived by Captain Dave Rosen USAF, exposes the
foundation for successfully integrating interoperability' into the acquisition life cycle and
requirements definition process.
2. CIPO Acquisition Process
Planning / Acquisitions
Figure 6-1, CIPO R-to-C Acquisition Process
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The cyclic process of translating requirements into capabilities (R-to-C) involves
several different players, drawn together by the concept of operations, or ConOps. As
depicted above, the overarching ConOps is composed of many localized, subordinate
ConOps. Some ConOps are functionally oriented while others are systems or
organizational. The relationships between the various ConOps are often quite complex.
They must be consistent with one another and the intersections between them be in
alignment to adequately define these relationships. The Rosen'OPO R-to-C Model
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Figure 6-2, Quadrant Centric Architectures
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a) Role-Centric
The CIPO model defines the Role-Centric (upper-left) portion of the
quadrant architecture as the notional "starting point" of the cycle. This construct is useful
because of its ability to associate roles (requirements) with systems (capabilities).
Mission areas/roles are initially defined in operational architectures. In examining the
CIPO model we have identified inherent problems in the Role-Centric process. The first
part of these problems revolves around the exclusionary nature of individual service-
based roles creating competition and division. What is needed is an easily referenced
demarcation and documentation of each service's role and the interrelations between
them.
Role-Centric Architectures















Role-centric architectures depend heavily on the association
between roles and the collections ofsystems (OPFACs) that
perform them
Figure 6-3, Role-Centric Architecture Mapping
The other part of the problem is that systems often must be designed to
perform many different roles. Systems are almost always Service-Centric, further
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intensifying the competition already instigated by doctrinal role rivalries. In this
competitive environment "role-creeps is ever-present due to the pressure to secure
budgetary priority that forces services to make systems "multi-mission" (while remaining
primarily "single-service"), further tightening the spiral by introducing "requirements-
creep" as well. In most instances this situation is the result of ignorance of the larger









System capabilities (current and
projected) are used to determine
what roles can be p!a> ped by the
OPFACs that employ them
Information Exchange Requirements are
levied on system types based on the roles
me system type is expected to perform
snflP f swiF
Figure 6-4, Role vs. System Centric Architectures
The CIPO also defines the System-Centric (upper-right) architecture. The
System-Centric architecture maps the system requirement to the system capability. There
are problems that surface in this part of the CIPO cycle as well. As seen previously.
systems are Service-Centric, while requirements ideally belong to the CINCs. This
conceivably can create conflicts in the requirements-tc system mapping process. The
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CIPO model implies that system capabilities be kept up-to-date so that planners creating
Role-Centric architectures are using the best information available to assign system
capabilities to role requirements. In reality it is the roles that seem to be shaped by the
systems- Why some argue that this is the "tail wagging the dog", that requirements must
be designed first, we must recognize that DoD is becoming a buyer, rather than a
developer. If we are to give our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Mariness the "overmatch"
capbability required to dominate the information battlespace, then in many instances,
technology will and should drive requirements. For the acquisition cops that dipute the














Organization-centric architectures describe fee capabilities of
OPFACs in terms ofthe activities they can perform and the systems
they own
Figure 6-5, Organization Centric Architectures
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In the Organization-Centric (lower-right) architecture OPFAC activities
are mapped to OPFAC systems. OPFACs are usually associated with an operational
organization, the same organizations that the CINC will draw from during Task Force
formation. OPFACs exhibit a many-to-many relationship with systems. For example, a
communications battalion may receive ATM switches from its systems command, or they
may receive a mixture of ATM, IP, and circuit switches. To compound the difficulty of
this type of many-to-many relationship, the communications battalion may use
discretionary' funds to purchase what they deem to be mission-critical systems not
approved by its systems command. The problem this creates is many systems designed to
perform the same or fewer functions, increasing the likelihood of interoperability
problems. The goal in the Organization-Centric quadrant can be summarized by the
following equation:
Interoperability = # of Systems / # of Roles
(where Interoperability is <= 1)
To achieve a value less than 1 we are looking for one SoS such as an IP network like the
Internet. When an OPFAC does adhere to the fielding plan, it may end up receiving a
system capability that it does not have an assigned role for. This can happen during the
fielding of new systems that were improperly identified or for units not correctly
identified in the activity-to-role process. As we have demonstrated, this can be one of the




-Mis$k>0-Ontric architectures synthesize OPFACs from the
Organizational Architecture with roJes from the Role-Centric
Architecture
Figure 6-6, Mission-Centric Architectures
The final architecture that the CIPO considers is the Mission-Centric
architecture. Mission-Centric architecture takes specific OPFACs from the
organizational architecture and maps them to requirements from the Role-Centric
architecture. Here CINCs attempt to integrate the products of the other; in other words
they will map the organizational (Components/Services/Agencies) to the operational
(Joint Task Forces). There are several common problems at this point in the cycle of
constructing Mission-Centric architectures. If organizational OPFACs have systems that
are not functioning within their roles or the CINC has the wrong OPFACs assigned he
will not be able to match available capabilities to needed requirements in order to
accomplish the mission. Nor will the CINC have the ability to rapidly configure ad-hoc
Mission-Centric architectures and/or explore contingency scenarios in order to develop
127
alternative courses of action. During our examination of the R-to-C cycle we have
determined that an adequate automated tool does not currently exist that has such
functionality.
3. Interoperability and PPBS
a) Mapping PPBS to the CIPO Model
The CIPO has constructed a very good model for mapping the R-to-C
process. By examining this cycle this we can begin to identify the systemic locations
where interoperability problems typically surface. However, what this model currently
lacks is a methodology to relate it onto an even more encompassing cycle, the Planning,
Programming and Budgeting System. In formulating solutions to the interoperability
question we must accept the PPBS as it currently is, at least in the short-term. Since we
cannot implement wholesale changes into the PPBS process we must find a way to
effectively achieve our goals within its current structure while continuing to examine, and
forward, intelligent long-term changes. What we must do is inject interoperability into
the PPBS stream by mapping the CIPO model onto the PPBS cycle.
b) DPG and ConOps
A proposal for accomplishing this would begin by replacing the CIPO
Model's ConOps with PPBS*s Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The DPG could, like
the ConOps, become the document that connects the tasks that each quadrant must
perform to turn National Security- Strategy (NSS) into a Budget Execution (BE). This
process powers the R-to-C process as surely as MNSs and ORDs. To continue to pursue
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our goals, interoperability efforts must also be in consonance with the PPBS. In Figure 6-
7 PPBS-specific functions are depicted in red and the Joint Strategic Planning System
(JSPS) process in teal.
Figure 6-7, PPBS/JSPS in the CIPO Model
c) Power ofthe Purse
How well the budget is executed within the DPG determines what the next
year's Integrated Products Lists (IPLs) will look like. For example, if a CINC asked for
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an OPFAC to fill a role and no current OPFAC had the system to fill that requirement the
CINC may list it in the IPL depending on the criticality of that system. This brings us
back to our previous discussion where the SYSCOMs are fielding new systems to the
OPFACs. If an OPFAC gets the wrong system you can see how it affects the CINCs in
the Mission-Centric quadrant architecture.
The Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment determines what future
Role-Centric capabilities the CINC based on the IPL needs. The Chairman's Program
Recommendations (CPR) are largely formed by the JWCA. The CPR is then fed back
into the DPG to ensure that CINC requirements are commensurate with the National
Military Strategy (NMS). This is the first instance of the intersection of the DPG and
ConOps functions. The DPG is then revised to become the basis for the Program
Objective Memorandum (POM). POM is the link between Role-Centric and System-
Centric architectures.
This relationship is important to interoperability. It is at this point where
priorities of the CINCs first come into conflict with those of the services. Both the Role-
Centric and System-Centric interactions serve to influence the POM. Role-Centric
considerations typically manifest as decisions made in regard to CRD formulation and
development. CRDs do not currently act as input to the POM; but ORDs do, and this is
what the Role-Centric C/S/As must rightly focus upon as they transition to the Service-
Centric quadrant for funding and development. As this process progresses the
environment is exacerbated by the exclusive Service-Centric Systems Commands and
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Program Executive Offices. At this point in the cycle the Chairman's Program
Assessment (CPA) can somewhat act as an advocate for Mission-Centric considerations,
affecting the DPG through the POM. Once the BE is sent to the President the process
again comes under Service-Centric influence via the "power of the purse".
E. TOOL FOR THE CIPO MODEL
1. PPBS and Interoperability
The PPBS system was not designed to facilitate interoperability; to the contrary, it
often directly obstructs interoperability initiatives, but knowing where the system breaks
down is the first step in fixing it. So how do we move the Mission-Centric quadrant
beyond Service-Centric quadrant parochialism?
The CIPO model addresses the "where" and "how" of interoperability fitting in
the R-to-C cycle and how it could work with the PPBS/JSPS systems. What all players
in each quadrant need are automated tools to help them function effectively in their own
quadrant and interact productively with adjacent quadrants. The Rosen/CIPO Model has
suggested where some of these tools may fit.
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Planning / Acquisitions










Figure 6-8, Tools in the CIPO Model
2. Automated Tool Integration
The CIPO has suggested that several of the currently available architecture and
interoperability tools fit into their model as depicted in Figure 6-8. Both their analysis
and ours both conclude that while the tools in their existing states do not satisfy all the
requirements for these activities, this is the position in the methodology that their
proposed functionality will support. In the CIPO model the conclusion is that there does
not yet exist an adequate tool to address the Mission-Centric quadrant. JCAPS was noted
as possibly being able to fill this role except for the fact it does not possess the capability
to integrate Role-Centric with Organization-Centric architectures. In its current state we
agree with this. We examined two additional tools, MSTAR and JMTIRA, that we
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believe could help fill this gap. Figure 6-9 is our depiction of the proposed integration of






















Figure 6-9, Tool Integration Into the CIPO Model
In this depiction JCAPS is the tool that will aid the players in tying all four
quadrants into a collaborative working group, providing the required linkage to both the
ConOps in the R-to-C cycle and to the DPG in the PPBS. JCAPS is fully supported by
the OSD and Joint levels and thus is better funded than the other programs, giving it the
greatest potential for maturation and operational acceptance. While JCAPS currently has
well defined limitations, as these are being identified and incorporated into changes to the
system and the process we feel that the potential to achieve this perceived functionality is
attainable.
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3. JCAPS Synthesis and Integration
a) MSTAR into JCAPS
The CIPO has stated that JCAPS cannot construct the Mission-Centric
architectures, i.e. mapping operational architectures to system architectures.44 JCAPS
can provide both operational and technical views but what it lacks is the root system
granularity that exists in MSTAR. This is reason we could not effectively construct a
MAGTF Integrated Package (MIP) using JCAPS. MSTAR has the requisite granularity,
primarily because it was designed as a Service-Centric architecture tool. If each Service
develops its own MSTAR -type application these repositories can be integrated as part of
a common JCAPS database, giving JCAPS the necessary granularity to construct
Mission-Centric architectures. Combined with the JCAPS client drawing capabilities,
this would enable CINCs to construct the identified requirement of ad-hoc task force
architecture development.
MSTAR is also more advanced than JCAPS in mapping programmatic
issues to the individual system. If JCAPS were to incorporate this feature by gaining
access to Service-Centric acquisition data this would functionally allow the "left-hand"
quadrant to know what the "right-hand" quadrant is doing. While the services will most
certainly be resistant to such a "looking glass" into their affairs, this is a necessary
prerequisite to achieving interoperability.
44 Rosen, David, Capt, JFPO. "Defining the Interoperability Battlespace". Presentation.
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b) LISI Inspector into JCAPS
The JCAPS program will allow interface to the LISI Inspector tool via
SIPRNET/NIPRNET access. This actually falls short of what MSTAR does by
embedding LISI Inspector into the program, allowing LISI Inspector to take advantage of
MSTAR' s system technical data and vice-versa. If JCAPS chooses to incorporate a
similar implementation this will improve the ad-hoc architecture construction
requirement mentioned previously. The marriage of LISI with JCAPS, thus incorporating
Service-Centric system data into the JCAPS repository, will enable LISI to become the
tool its developers originally envisioned, and also giving JCAPS a powerful
interoperability assessment feature for all four quadrants of the CIPO model.
c) JMTIRA into JCAPS
With further development, JMTIRA could provide the "missing link" for
the left-hand quadrant of the CIPO model. While LISI tells planners where
interoperability problems exist JMTIRA could have the ability to tell whether these
problems have been tested, recommend effective test scenarios, and most importantly
assign a quantitative risk level if the interoperability issue is not resolved. In an era when
CINCs confront dwindling financial resources, this type of operational risk management
gives them a true decision aid in determining whether they can afford to ignore the issue
or expend the resources required to resolve it. Role and System -Centric architects can
also save significant dollars by identifying risk factors early on in a program's
development cycle by utilizing JMTIRA.
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4. JCAPS in Action
This sort of integrated JCAPS tool could be used in the CIPO model to effectively
interact the PPBS and JSPS cycles. All the C4ISR Architecture Framework views could
be shared among all quadrant players of the CIPO model. Differences and issues that
surface could be resolved in a more collaborative environment. Programmatic issues
such as configuration management, budgetary considerations, and acquisition objectives
would be available to CINCs as well as PMs. JCAPS could also be used to
collaboratively "what-if" scenarios in the PM's environment as well as the CINCs.
Technical descriptions and system capabilities could be made available to budget
planners, quantifying and highlighting risk if these systems are not funded. JCAPS could
become the central workplace for all CIPO Model stakeholders to share ideas and
information, thereby constructing a truly joint, interoperable system of systems.
a) SDDA Chain
To demonstrate what an integrated JCAPS tool would do we need to look
at the Sense-Decide-Decide-Act Chain (SDDA). Figure 6-10 depicts this cycle as it is
today.45 The sensor suite is a homogenous set of sensors representing a service-centric or
program-specific system. Today, we can exchange information between the sensors and
the decision maker that the service-centric system was targeted for. However, add a
different decision node that was not the target of the initial system, and in most cases,
information cannot be exchanged. This is our current interoperability dilemma.
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Figure 6-10, SDDA Chain
What we need to do is integrate the homogenous or service centric sensors
with other sensors using a heterogeneous-sensor fusion process. Instead of exchanging
information with one decision node we can now exchange information with multiple
decision nodes. Figure 6-11 models how this would be done.
We combine the decision and action nodes into an OODA loop node based
on the Boyd Cycle (observation, orientation, decision, and action). The ability of any
OODA node to take advantage of all sensor platforms is the goal of interoperability. An
integrated JCAPS tool, in a collaborative environment of all four quadrants of the CIPO
model can achieve this goal. JCAPS can tell us the what and why of the sensor fusion,
MSTAR/LISI can tell us how, and JMTIRA can tell us the consequence of one or more
sensor platforms being lost, or unable to exchange information.




Figure 6-11, Sensor Fusion
We can call each of these heterogenous fusion models a module, and there
may be several of these modules within a CINC area of operations. We now link these
modules as nodes in a network with the OODA nodes as subscribers. If one module node
is lost
,
the remain OODA nodes can still exchange information with any of the other
module nodes.
Mapping this process to the development quadrants, the modules can be
fielded as a more modularized MIP. This revised MIP (RMIP) should be a complete
transition from the taxonomic (descriptive) to the operational (prescriptive). CINCs can
now plug in these RMIPs like nodes in a network. The RMIPs can be built around
functions or as OPFACs. The nodes can exchange information with other OODA nodes
using a common protocol such as IP. We now could have a IP-based network that truly
could facilitate technical implementations of interoperability.
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Obstacles to this vision will abound. It will be difficult to get inside the PM "rice-
bowl" to share programmatic data. The data repositories themselves will rely on quadrant
players maintaining the currency and quality of their information. Finally, there must be
an overarching advocate for the entire system, maintaining information, enforcing data
integrity, and acting as a mediator when roles, budgets and missions inevitably come into
conflict. An integrated JCAPS tool must remain a joint program; mutually funded and
developed by the Services to provide the collaborative environment they all need to meet
the requirements of JV2020.
F. CHALLENGE OF THE JOINT STRUCTURE
Though the goal of C4I systems is that they be interoperable in a joint
environment, this horizontal objective must be realized in a world that is fundamentally
vertical. As discussed, the vertical focus of acquisition comes from the fact that systems
are acquired and funded by the individual C/S/As, and the acquisition system itself is
geared toward the development of discrete components rather than system-wide
capabilities. PMs are generally held accountable for their piece of a system, not for the
performance of the whole system of systems. This remains one of the fundamental
stumbling blocks for the procedural initiatives that have been proposed to enhance
interoperability. An obvious recommendation would be to realign how "success" is
determined for individual programs by de-emphasizing the traditional measures of
performance, cost, and schedule. This type of change is difficult to quantify and most
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certainly would be a long-term implementation since it involves organizational and
cultural -level issues.
The challenge of managing interoperability is one of addressing its state
throughout the entire enterprise rather than attempting to measure every variable in each
possible scenario. It is generally accepted that management must be able to measure
what they wish to change. The ways in which interoperability can be measured and
reported differs intrinsically from the factors included in other areas of combat readiness.
C/S/As are not necessarily in a position to ascertain the status of external C4I systems.
This is a key issue in determining the ability to conduct successful joint combat
operations. Interoperability is an indirect contributor to combat power, and hence
difficult to quantify. Interoperability must be assessed at the joint level for it to have any
meaning for the enterprise, and the joint structure must be empowered to enforce its
initiatives, initiatives that will often be at odds with the priorities of the C/S/As. Until
this dichotomy has been resolved, interoperability will not reach its full potential.
140
APPENDIX A
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